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State Regulation of Federal Contractors: 
Three Puzzles of Procurement Preemption 
David S. Rubenstein* 
This Article unpacks three doctrinal puzzles at the intersection of federalism and federal 
contracting, using student loan law as its anchoring case study. Currently, more than $1 
trillion of federal student loan debt is serviced by private financial institutions under contract 
with the Department of Education. These loan servicers have allegedly engaged in systemic 
consumer abuses but are seldom held accountable by the federal government. To bridge the 
accountability gap, several states have recently passed “Student Borrower Bills of Rights.” 
These state laws include provisions to regulate the student loan servicing industry, including 
the Department’s federal contractors. States undoubtedly have legitimate interests to protect 
their residents, communities, and local economies against industry malfeasance. The 
overarching question, however, is whether federal law prohibits states from performing this 
remedial function. This Article offers a fresh look at three doctrinal puzzles at the heart of 
that debate. The first puzzle is whether the federal government’s constitutional immunity 
extends to shield federal contractors from generally applicable state laws. The second puzzle 
is whether federal procurement laws preempt state licensing of federal contractors. The third 
puzzle is whether federal contracts that expressly incorporate state law can save state law from 
preemption. Individually and collectively, how these puzzles are resolved may have far-reaching 
implications—not only for the future of student loan law, but also for federalism and federal 
contracting more generally. 
  
 
* James R. Ahrens Chair in Constitutional Law and Director, Robert Dole Center for Law and 
Government, Washburn University School of Law. For incisive suggestions, comments, and critiques 
on earlier drafts, the author thanks the participants and sponsors of the Consumer Protection in the 
Age of Student Debt Crisis symposium at UC Irvine. For superb research and editing, the author thanks 
Kaitlyn Bull, Penny Fell, Barbara Ginsberg, Paige Reese, Creighton Miller, and the UC Irvine  
Law Review. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supremacy Clause is the Constitution’s primary mechanism for resolving 
conflicts of law between federal and state sovereigns.1 It was not designed for 
triangulated clashes between states and private actors doing federal contractual 
work. This structural mismatch gives rise to knotty doctrinal questions at the 
intersection of federalism and federal contracting—a domain I have elsewhere 
described as “Supremacy, Inc.”2 Expanding on that work, this Article examines 
three unresolved doctrinal puzzles in the undertheorized space where federalism 
 
1. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing that “Laws of the United States” shall be the 
“supreme Law of the Land,” notwithstanding “[c]ontrary” state law); see also Bradford R. Clark, 
Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421 (2008) (providing 
a rich account of the drafting history and structural compromises forged around the Supremacy Clause). 
2. See David S. Rubenstein, Supremacy, Inc., 67 UCLA L. REV. 1108 (2020) [hereinafter 
Rubenstein, Supremacy, Inc. ] (providing the first comprehensive account of federal contracting’s 
spillover effects on state autonomy and the federalist balance of power). 
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and federal contracting meet. The first puzzle is whether the federal government’s 
constitutional immunity extends to shield its contractors from generally applicable 
state laws.3 The second puzzle is whether federal procurement law preempts state 
licensing of federal contractors.4 The third puzzle is whether federal contracts can 
save state law from preemption.5 Individually and collectively, the resolution of 
these puzzles may have far-flung implications for federalism, federal contracting, 
and the operation of modern government.6 Nowhere is this more apparent than in 
the area of federal student loans, which this Article takes as its anchoring case study.7 
Part I sets the foundation. Currently, the federal government owns more than 
$1 trillion in outstanding student debt.8 Rather than manage this huge portfolio  
in-house, the Department of Education (ED) contracts with private loan servicing 
companies to collect borrower payments and perform other administrative tasks.9 
According to ED’s internal watchdog, many of these contractors have engaged in 
systemic wrongdoing but are seldom sanctioned by the federal government.10 To 
 
3. See infra Part II. 
4. See infra Part III. 
5. See infra Part IV. 
6. This Article uses the terms “outsourcing” and “contracting” interchangeably to mean 
government acquisition of goods and services from private parties. The term “privatization” has a 
broader meaning, which can include any transfer of activity, goods, or functions from the public to the 
private sector. See KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33777, PRIVATIZATION AND THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 2–3 (2006). In America, however, outsourcing is the 
most prevalent form of privatization. Id. at 12–20 (defining and describing various modes of 
privatization in the United States). For purposes of this Article, I use all three terms interchangeably. 
7. This case study draws from my prior work in Rubenstein, Supremacy, Inc., supra note 2, at 
1138–42. There, I also provide a parallel case study for immigration detention, which raises many of 
the same doctrinal issues. Id. at 1132–38; see also David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, 
Privatized Detention & Immigration Federalism, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 224 (2019). 
8. See Portfolio by Loan Status (DL, FFEL, ED Held FFEL, ED-Owned), Report for Federal 
Student Loan Portfolio, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/
student/portfolio [https://perma.cc/9SCE-CB3Z] ( last visited Dec. 5, 2019) (reporting that the 
categories listed under “Federally Managed” total $1.296 trillion at the end of the third quarter of 2019); 
Zach Friedman, Student Loan Debt Statistics in 2020: A Record $1.6 Trillion, FORBES (Feb. 3, 2020, 
6:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2020/02/03/student-loan-debt-statistics/
#2903c31c281f [https://perma.cc/9KTC-RKUS] (providing a breakdown of outstanding federally 
and privately-owned student debt, most of which is federally owned). 
9. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A05Q0008, FEDERAL 
STUDENT AID: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF SERVICER 
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICING FEDERALLY HELD STUDENT LOANS 5–6 
(2019) [hereinafter DEP’T EDUC. OIG REPORT ], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/
auditreports/fy2019/a05q0008.pdf [https://perma.cc/L83R-LJPY] ( last visited Oct. 4, 2020); see also 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-523, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: EDUCATION COULD 
IMPROVE DIRECT LOAN PROGRAM CUSTOMER SERVICE AND OVERSIGHT (2016), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/680/677159.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TBJ-LZNT].  
10. DEP’T EDUC. OIG REPORT, supra note 9, at 10–11. These allegations are corroborated by 
numerous internal and external watchdog reports. For a useful collection and summary of such reports, 
see BEN KAUFMAN, STUDENT BORROWER PROT. CTR., ASSESSMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION’S HANDLING OF THE STUDENT LOAN PORTFOLIO: A REVIEW (2019), https://
protectborrowers.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/SLLI_Assessments-of-ED_A-Review.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AD8B-VRHZ]. 
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bridge the accountability gap, several states have recently enacted laws to monitor 
and regulate the federal government’s student loan servicers.11 In response, the 
federal government and its contractors have moved to quash these state initiatives 
under the Supremacy Clause.12  
These sovereign clashes have exposed a set of doctrinal puzzles of 
“procurement preemption” that have escaped academic scrutiny. While student 
loan litigation provides rich context for studying these puzzles in real time, the 
doctrinal issues scope well beyond this domain.13 Federal outsourcing is 
“ubiquitous.”14 In lieu of federal actors, contractors routinely deliver government 
services, interface with regulatory beneficiaries, and act as gatekeepers to statutory 
benefits under major federal programs.15 With no end in sight for federal 
outsourcing, or the demand for accountable governance, the courts’ resolution of 
these puzzles of procurement preemption could mark a new chapter in American 
federalism.  
Part II turns to the first puzzle, which interrogates a doctrinal boundary within 
Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. Under long standing precedent, state law may run 
afoul of the Supremacy Clause in two ways.16 First, validly enacted federal law 
 
11. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 2251, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); Assemb. B. 376,  
2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020); H.B. 6915, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2015);  
S.B. 19-002, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019); D.C. Act 21-571, 2016 Council of  
D.C. (D.C. 2016); S.B. 1351, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017); Legis. Doc. 995, 129th Leg.,  
Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); Assemb. B. 455, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2019); H.B. 5936, 2019  
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2019); S.B. 6029, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018); S.B. 77, 2020  
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020). 
12. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States, Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency  
v. Perez, No. 3:18-cv-1114 (MPS) (D. Conn. Dec. 20, 2019); Federal Preemption and State Regulation 
of the Department of Education’s Federal Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 
83 Fed. Reg. 10619, 10620–21 (Mar. 12, 2018) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. ch. VI).  
13. See, e.g., Complaint, GEO Grp., Inc. v. Newsom, No. 3:19-cv-02491-JLS-WVG, 2019 WL 
7373612 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2019) (alleging that California’s legislation directed at private immigration 
detention facilities in the state violates intergovernmental immunity and preemption doctrines). For 
additional discussion of these issues, as pertains to immigration detention, see generally Rubenstein  
& Gulasekaram, supra note 7. 
14. JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 97 (2017) (“[O]utsourcing is completely and utterly ubiquitous—and still  
gaining speed.”). 
15. PAUL C. LIGHT, THE GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: THE TRUE SIZE OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1984–2018, at 88 (2018) (“[M]illions of employees show up for work every 
day to do work once performed by federal employees.”); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551–52 (2000) (discussing the pervasiveness of private actors in 
“regulation, service provision, policy design, and implementation”); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1398 (2003) (explaining that contractors “wield power over 
others” and “control third parties’ access to government benefits and resources”); Sidney A. Shapiro, 
Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 389 (2003) (“The government has increasingly 
relied on private means to achieve public ends, not only involving services to the public, but the 
origination and implementation of regulatory policy as well . . . .”). 
16. See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 434–37 (1990). 
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preempts contrary state law.17 Second, under the intergovernmental immunity 
doctrine, states cannot directly regulate the federal government and cannot 
“discriminate” against the federal government or “those with whom it deals.”18 The 
boundary between preemption and intergovernmental immunity has always been 
fluid.19 And in some cases, the boundary is inconsequential because both doctrines 
lead to the same result. For example, a discriminatory state law directed at federal 
contractors that conflicts with federal statutes would be void under the 
intergovernmental immunity doctrine (by virtue of the discrimination) and 
preempted by federal law (by virtue of the conflict). But for a large category of 
nondiscriminatory state regulations—such as generally applicable consumer 
protection laws—the doctrinal lines can matter. Preemption doctrine indisputably 
applies to such laws. The puzzle, however, is whether nondiscriminatory state 
regulations must clear a second doctrinal hurdle of intergovernmental immunity. In 
North Dakota v. United States, the Supreme Court had a 4-4 split of opinion on this 
issue.20 Thirty years later, and still unresolved, the issue has resurfaced with new 
hue. In statehouses and courthouses across the country, politicians and jurists are 
puzzling over whether generally applicable state regulations can apply to federal 
contractors.21 On doctrinal and normative grounds, this Article argues that 
nondiscriminatory state regulation of federal contractors may be preempted by 
federal law, but are beyond the remit of intergovernmental immunity doctrine.22  
Part III explores a second puzzle: namely, whether federal procurement law 
preempts state licensing laws. The current administration and its student loan 
servicers rely on Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas23 (and progeny)24 to argue that state 
licensing laws impermissibly second-guess and interfere with the government’s 
contracting decisions.25 This Article disrupts that legal narrative. Like the 
schoolhouse game of telephone, the 1950s case of Leslie Miller has been lost in 
 
17. See Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1901 (2019) (explaining that “[t]he 
Supremacy Clause supplies a rule of priority” as between federal and state law); Hughes v. Talen Energy 
Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016) (“Put simply, federal law preempts contrary state law.”); infra 
Section II.B (discussing preemption doctrine). 
18. See North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 434–37. 
19. See infra Part II.A (discussing the permeability and fluidity of these doctrines across time).  
20. 495 U.S. 423; see infra Part II.A (discussing North Dakota and the Justices’  
competing viewpoints). 
21. See infra Section III.C.2.  
22. The approach urged here aligns with North Dakota’s four-Justice plurality opinion and 
fortifies it with historical, doctrinal, and theoretical support absent from that opinion. See generally infra 
Part II. 
23. 352 U.S. 187 (1956). 
24. See Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963); see also United States v. Virginia, 
139 F.3d 984, 987–89 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that state licensing requirements were preempted under 
the auspice of Leslie Miller); Gartrell Constr. Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437, 439–41 (9th Cir. 1991) (same). 
25. See, e.g., Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal 
Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10619, 10620–21 (Mar. 12, 
2018) (relying on Leslie Miller and progeny). 
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translation.26 Properly understood, Leslie Miller does not create a categorical or  
free-floating prohibition on state licensing of federal contractors.27 Rather, as 
always, preemption turns on a conflict, vel non, between federal and state law. 
Acontextual readings of Leslie Miller lose sight of that basic principle, blurring past 
important differences in federal procurement regimes across context and time. 
Modern federal procurement is variegated to accommodate a range of  
good-governance norms that state licensing laws may promote and cohere with.28 
Indeed, the federal government’s student loan contracts anticipate, if not require, 
compliance with all federal and state law.29   
This leads to a third and final puzzle, teased out in Part IV. In Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corporation, the Supreme Court held that federal contracts can preempt 
state law in contexts where federal law itself does not.30 The current administration 
and its contractors rely on Boyle to argue that their contracts preempt state law.31 
Elsewhere, I have argued that Boyle’s imprimatur of preemption by contract is 
constitutionally and normatively dubious.32 Here, I take Boyle as given, and zoom 
out to frame a new puzzle: Can federal contracts that explicitly incorporate or 
impose state law requirements save state law from preemption? According to the 
current administration and its contractors, the answer is no.33 But if “preemption 
by contract” and “saving by contract” are two sides of the same coin, then the  
heads-I-win, tails-you-lose approach espoused by the government and its contractors 
demands an explanation.  
 
26. Though incremental abstractions and extensions, the lore of Leslie Miller has seemingly 
morphed into a rule unto itself. See infra Section III.B. 
27. See id. 
28. See generally JAMES F. NAGLE, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING (1992); KATE 
M. MANUEL, L. ELAINE HALCHIN, ERIKA K. LUNDER & MICHELLE D. CHRISTENSEN, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., R42826, THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR): ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS (2015) (providing a summary of major developments in federal procurement law 
beginning in the 1980s); see also infra Part III.A (discussing some key features of modern federal 
procurement). 
29. See, e.g., Sample Contract add. § C.1.4.3 (on file with author) (providing that the servicers 
“will be responsible for maintaining a full understanding of all federal and state laws and regulations and 
FSA requirements and ensuring that all aspects of the service continue to remain in compliance as changes 
occur”) (emphasis added); id. at attach. A-3 (specifying that “[s]ervicers will be required to meet all 
statutory and legislative requirements”). 
30. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988); see also Rubenstein, Supremacy, 
Inc., supra note 2, at 1156–60 (discussing Boyle and characterizing the so-called government contractor 
defense as a form of preemption by contract).  
31. See, e.g., Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, No. 3:18-cv-1114 (MPS), 2020 WL 
2079634, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 30, 2020) (holding that Connecticut’s request for documents from federal 
student loan servicers violated the Privacy Act and federal contractual terms).  
32. See Rubenstein, Supremacy, Inc., supra note 2, at 1160–66. 
33. See, e.g., Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal 
Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10619, 10620–21 (Mar. 12, 
2018) (arguing that state law is preempted by federal contracts and citing Boyle); see also Student Loan 
Servicing All. v. District of Columbia (SLSA), 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 65 (D.D.C. 2018) (“If a state law is 
preempted under the Supremacy Clause, that state law is invalid, and state actors may not adhere to it 
whether directed to by a contract or not.”). 
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I. FEDERAL CONTRACTING AND FEDERALISM 
Private entities have always supplied the federal government with goods and 
services (e.g., laundry service, milk, helicopters, construction, and so on).34 Today, 
however, federal contractors routinely stand in for federal employees to do 
important government work.35 For better and worse, the marbling of public and 
private enterprise has transfigured how government operates, if not also what 
government is.36 While some commentators hail federal outsourcing as a key 
innovation of modern government,37 others decry its distorting effects on 
constitutional rights, separation of powers, and administrative law.38 But federalism 
 
34. See MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 21–117 (2017) (discussing the evolution of federal 
outsourcing through American history); Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The 
Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52  
ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 881–90 (2000) (discussing the ideological and political shift toward federal 
outsourcing in the mid-to-late twentieth century). 
35. PAUL C. LIGHT, THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE, THE TRUE SIZE OF  
GOVERNMENT: TRACKING WASHINGTON’S BLENDED WORKFORCE, 1984–2015, at 3 (2017), https://
www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Issue%20Paper_True%20Size%20of%20 
Government.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6UD-Y5AN] (reporting that in 2015, the federal government’s 
“blended workforce” included approximately two million federal employees, and more than 3.5 million 
contract employees).  
36. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Landyn Wm. Rookard, Private Government and the Transparency 
Deficit, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 437, 440 (2019) (“The ‘government’ with which the average citizen interacts 
is a complex admixture of private and public actors, empowered by an intricate web of statutes, 
regulations, contracts, and less formal partnerships.”); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on 
Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 402–21 (2006) (describing the erosion of 
the public-private dichotomy occasioned by rampant government outsourcing). 
37. See, e.g., E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT 4–6, 119–230 
(1987) (noting “that privatization, properly carried out, generally leads to large increases in efficiency 
while improving or at least maintaining the level and quality of public services”). See generally AL GORE, 
NAT’L PERFORMANCE REV., FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT 
WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS (1993); DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING 
GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO STATEHOUSE, CITY HALL TO THE PENTAGON (1992). 
38. For discussion pertaining to constitutional rights, see generally Metzger, supra note 15; PAUL 
R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS 
THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 166–67 (2007) [hereinafter 
OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY ]. For discussion pertaining to separation of powers, see Paul R. Verkuil, 
Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 310 ( Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the 
Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 
85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 72–73 (1990); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, 
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377 (2006); MICHAELS, 
supra note 14, at 18 (characterizing privatization as perhaps the “greatest threat” to separation of powers 
because it usurps the checks and balances forged around administrative governance—what he calls 
“administrative separation of powers”). For discussion pertaining to administrative law, see generally 
id.; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy: Resources in Administrative Law, in GOVERNMENT 
BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 261 ( Jody Freeman & Martha Minow 
eds., 2009); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reconstructing an Administrative Republic, 116 MICH. L. REV. 959 
(2018) (reviewing MICHAELS, supra note 14).  
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is where much of the action is today.39 Across the regulatory spectrum, state 
officials and advocacy groups are mobilizing to hold federal contractors 
accountable to state law. Meanwhile, the federal government and its contractors are 
hoping to find refuge in the Supremacy Clause.  
The student loan case study below provides easy access to these federalism 
clashes and illustrates the stakes. On one hand, state law offers a reservoir of 
possibility to close the accountability and transparency gaps in federal contracting. 
On the other, however, state regulation may disrupt or detract from the putative 
benefits of federal contracting. 
A. Case Study: Student Loan Servicing 
Before 2010, the federal student loan program was dominated by private loans 
that were financially guaranteed by the United States.40 Beginning in 2010, the 
federal government transitioned to a “Direct Loan” program, under which the 
federal government is the student lender.41 Moreover, as part of a financial bailout 
for the student loan industry, the federal government purchased almost all of the 
outstanding privately owned student debt.42 Today, the federal government’s assets 
include upwards of $1 trillion in collectable student loans.43 In theory, this 
mammoth portfolio could be serviced by federal employees. Instead, Congress 
explicitly authorized ED to outsource the work to private  
financial institutions.44  
Pursuant to this authority, ED has contracted with student loan servicers who 
collect student payments, advise borrowers on available resources and repayment 
options, respond to borrower inquiries, and perform other administrative tasks.45 
Congress’s decision to outsource this work was the obvious choice, if not the only 
choice. ED has nowhere near the capacity to service its student loan portfolio, and 
the financial industry offers economies of scale that might reduce programmatic 
 
39. See Rubenstein, Supremacy, Inc., supra note 2, at 1121–30 (offering an original account of 
how modern federal contracting distorts the federal-state balance of power); see also Kate Elengold  
& Jonathan Glater, The Sovereign Shield, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3539622 [https://perma.cc/ZW3V-QRKS]; Craig 
Konnoth, Preemption Through Privatization, 134 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3572777 [https://perma.cc/S77R-873M].   
40. See JULIE MARGETTA MORGAN, ROOSEVELT INST., WHO PAYS? HOW INDUSTRY 
INSIDERS RIG THE STUDENT LOAN SYSTEM—AND HOW TO STOP IT 2 (2018), https://
rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Who-Pays-Insiders-Rig-Student-Loan-System-
201806.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2Z6-PSPJ ]. 
41. See Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-227, 122 
Stat. 740 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); MORGAN, supra note 40, at 5. 
42. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087a, 1087i (granting broad authority to the Department of Education to 
purchase student loans from private student lenders); MORGAN, supra note 40, at 2–3. 
43. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
44. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087f. 
45. See Loan Servicing Contracts, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/
data-center/business-info/contracts/loan-servicing [https://perma.cc/9TRV-SHMV] ( last visited 
Feb. 9, 2020). 
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costs. Too often overlooked, however, are the value judgments—and  
tradeoffs—embedded in the outsourcing choice.  
Most pertinent here, the accountability structures around federal procurement 
are notoriously porous.46 By dint of their private status, federal contractors operate 
beyond public-law constraints that would apply to federal actors doing identical 
work. For example, federal student loan servicers are not subject to the 
Constitution,47 Administrative Procedure Act,48 Freedom of Information Act,49 or 
other public laws that define and limit government authority.50 Thus, when 
Congress authorized ED to outsource federal loan servicing to private financial 
institutions, some of the most vital accountability structures in our legal system were 
rendered inoperative.  Presumably, Congress hoped that ED’s contractors would be 
held accountable by other means, yet in ways that would not undercut the fiscal and 
programmatic efficiencies that private institutions offer. Toward those ends, the 
Higher Education Act and federal procurement regulations require ED to award 
contracts to “qualified” and “responsible” student loan servicers.51 Moreover, ED 
is responsible for monitoring its loan servicers’ compliance with federal law and 
 
46. See Nina A. Mendelson, Six Simple Steps to Increase Contractor Accountability, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 241, 243 & n.14 ( Jody 
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (lamenting that “federal agency supervision of contract 
performance is widely recognized as inadequate,” and collecting citations to “countless reports 
documenting inadequate contract supervision by agencies” by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office); OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 38, at 148–52 (lamenting that contractor monitoring 
is quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate). 
47. Generally speaking, the Constitution applies only to public actors. On rare occasions, private 
actors are treated as federal actors under the “state action” doctrine, which is a judicial determination 
that private action should be treated as public action for constitutional purposes. See Metzger, supra note 
15, at 1373. Absent exceptional circumstances, however, federal contractors do not generally qualify as 
public actors. Id. at 1369–70, 1403–06 (explaining how and why federal contractors are generally 
immune from constitutional strictures under the state action doctrine); see also Lillian BeVier & John 
Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1786 (2010) (“Constitutional 
rules are almost all addressed to the government.”). 
48. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–504, 551–559, 561–584, 591–596. Broadly speaking, the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) provides a general statutory framework of procedures agencies must follow and 
the availability and scope of judicial review of agency decisions. Id. But federal contractors are not 
“agencies” for purposes of the Act. Id. § 551 (defining “agencies”). 
49. Id. § 552; Aman & Rookard, supra note 36, at 446 (“Private providers almost always fall 
outside of the scope of [the Freedom of Information Act], even when they provide public services 
pursuant to contracts with public agencies.”). 
50. See Kimberly N. Brown, “We the People,” Constitutional Accountability, and Outsourcing 
Government, 88 IND. L.J. 1347, 1361–63 (2013) (discussing the asymmetrical legal rules that apply to 
federal and private actors); Guttman, supra note 34, at 862, 881–90 (explaining that “in practice, two 
different sets of regulations have come to govern those doing the basic work of government”; those 
that apply to federal officials, on the one hand, and those that apply to federal contractors, on  
the other). 
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1087f(a)(2); 48 C.F.R. subpt. 9.1 (2019). 
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contractual obligations.52 The current administration and its contractors portray 
these procurement laws as reasons to quash or quell state law accountability.53  
Too much accountability—especially the wrong kind—could be unnecessary, 
costly, and counterproductive.54 A decade of experience, however, demonstrates 
that the federal controls in place are not working.55 Indeed, ED’s spotty oversight 
of its contractor workforce is a contributing, if not exacerbating, cause of the 
student loan crisis gripping the nation.56 According to a 2019 report from ED’s 
internal watchdog, the agency has insufficient procedures and policies to detect 
patterns of industry maladministration.57 Even when ED detected wrongdoing, the 
agency rarely used available contract provisions to hold the offending loan servicers 
accountable.58 Consequently, the report concludes, ED removed important 
incentives that were included in the contracts to protect student borrowers, their 
families, and taxpayer dollars.59 Exacerbating these concerns, ED has repeatedly 
and proactively shielded its student loan servicers from public transparency and 
accountability.60  
 
52. See 48 C.F.R. § 37.114 (2019) (requiring agency oversight, control, and monitoring of federal 
service contracts); H.R. 2740, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2020) (conditioning funds on agency oversight of 
federal student loan servicers).  
53. See, e.g., Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal 
Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10619, 10619 (Mar. 12, 2018) 
(“[T]he servicing of Direct Loans is an area ‘involving uniquely Federal interests’ that must be ‘governed 
exclusively by Federal law.’’’); see also Letter from Kathleen Smith, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Off. of 
Postsecondary Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., and Dr. A. Wayne Johnson, Chief Operating Officer,  
Fed. Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Aug. 31, 
2017) (rescinding ED’s information-sharing agreement with CFPB on the putative grounds that ED 
“has full oversight responsibility for federal student loans.”). 
54. See 48 C.F.R. § 37.114 (2019) (requiring agency oversight, control, and monitoring of federal 
service contracts); see also Stan Soloway & Alan Chvotkin, Federal Contracting in Context: What Drives 
It, How to Improve It, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
204 ( Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (“[T]here is no evidence that substantial overhauls of 
procurement law, or the addition of new regulatory or statutory requirements, will meaningfully 
improve the process.”). For useful summaries of federal procurement, see generally Mathew Blum, The 
Federal Framework for Competing Commercial Work Between the Public and Private Sectors, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 63 ( Jody Freeman  
& Martha Minow eds., 2009); MANUEL ET AL., supra note 28. 
55. For an excellent collection and summary of such reports, see KAUFMAN, supra note 10. 
56. See Seth Frotman, Broken Promises: How Debt-Financed Higher Education Rewrote America’s 
Social Contract and Fueled a Quiet Crisis, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 811, 822–31 (2018) (“It is increasingly 
clear that the student debt crisis is much broader than a series of individual student loan defaults. As 
more Americans pursue higher education, only to be weighed down by unaffordable student debt, this 
supposed equalizer is quickly turning into one of the greatest forces cementing economic inequality in 
this nation.”); Judith Scott-Clayton, Brookings Inst., The Looming Student Loan Default Crisis Is Worse 
than We Thought, 2 EVIDENCE SPEAKS REPS., no. 34, Jan. 10, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/scott-clayton-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QU94-YK8V] (discussing the 
socioeconomic domino effects of student loan defaults).  
57. See DEP’T EDUC. OIG REPORT, supra note 9.  
58. Id. at 2. 
59. Id. 
60. See MORGAN, supra note 40, at 2, 5–6. 
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To help bridge these gaps, several states have recently passed “Student 
Borrower Bills of Rights.” Although the details vary, these state initiatives contain 
provisions to monitor, license, and regulate the student loan industry—including 
federal contractors.61 States undoubtedly have legitimate interests to protect their 
residents, communities, and local economies against loan servicing abuses.62 Apart 
from protecting the rights of student borrowers, these state-centric initiatives have 
the potential to make federal student loan servicing more accountable and 
transparent on a systemic level. The overarching question, however, is whether 
states may lawfully pursue these objectives through state regulation. According to 
the current administration and its student loan servicers, many of the recently 
enacted state regulations run afoul of the Supremacy Clause.63  
B. The Supremacy Clause’s Sibling Doctrines 
The Supremacy Clause provides, in relevant part, that federal “Laws . . . made 
in Pursuance [of the Constitution]” shall be “supreme Law of the Land,” 
notwithstanding any state law to the “[c]ontrary.”64 As earlier noted, this clause is 
the progenitor of two sibling doctrines: preemption and intergovernmental 
immunity. The boundary between these doctrines has always been fluid, but they 
cover different ground, stand on different constitutional footing, and are 
implemented through different tests.65 
1. Preemption 
Under the Court’s familiar taxonomy, Congress may statutorily preempt state 
law expressly or impliedly.66 Congress does so expressly when it enacts a statute that 
 
61.  See, e.g., Assemb. B. 2251, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); Assemb. B. 376,  
2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020); H.B. 6915, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2015);  
S.B. 19-002, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019); D.C. Act 21-571, 2016 Council of  
D.C. (D.C. 2016); S.B. 1351, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017); Legis. Doc. 995, 129th Leg.,  
Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); Assemb. B. 455, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2019); H.B. 5936, 2019  
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2019); S.B. 6029, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018); S.B. 77, 2020  
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020). 
62. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41–42 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Because 
consumer protection law is a field traditionally regulated by the states, compelling evidence of an 
intention to preempt is required in this area.”). 
63. See Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal 
Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10619 (Mar. 12, 2018) 
(proffering a mix of preemption and intergovernmental immunity defenses); Statement of Interest of 
the United States at 24, Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, No. 3:18-cv-1114 (MPS)  
(D. Conn. Dec. 20, 2019). 
64. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
65. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (concluding that state 
taxation of National Bank was void under a theory of intergovernmental immunity), with Osborn  
v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (suggesting that, in McCulloch, the state tax was void 
because it conflicted with the federal statute that established the National Bank). 
66. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399–401 (2012). 
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explicitly withdraws state jurisdiction over a subject.67 Congress impliedly preempts state 
law in three ways. First, Congress impliedly preempts a regulatory field when it enacts 
sufficiently pervasive and detailed legislation targeting a certain industry or type of 
conduct (i.e., field preemption).68 Second, Congress impliedly preempts state law that 
frustrates or poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of lawful federal objectives (i.e., 
obstacle preemption).69 Third, Congress impliedly preempts state law when it would be 
impossible for a party to comply with both federal and state law (i.e.,  
impossibility preemption).70  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has long held that federal agencies can preempt 
state law in the same ways as Congress.71 For example, an agency can pass a binding 
regulation that expressly displaces state law.72 Alternatively, state law may be 
impliedly preempted if it directly conflicts with or frustrates the purposes of an 
agency’s regulatory scheme.73  
Rounding out the federal branches, state law may also be preempted by 
“federal common law.”74 The modern Court is generally loathe to fashion new 
federal common law rules or extend old ones.75 Thus, the cases in which federal 
courts “may engage in common lawmaking are few and far between.”76 One such 
case, however, is directly pertinent here.77 In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the 
 
67. Id. at 399 (citing Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 590 (2011)). 
68. Id. (first citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); and then citing 
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)). 
69. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
70. Id. (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)). 
71. See David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1137–38, 1147–52 
(2012) (comparing and contextualizing the Supreme Court’s statutory and administrative preemption 
doctrines); City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1988) (holding that a “federal agency acting 
within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may preempt” state law); see also Hillsborough 
Cnty. v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (explaining that “state laws can be  
pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes”). 
72. See David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
267, 275–83 (2015) (providing a typology of the Court’s administrative preemption doctrine). 
73. See id. at 276; Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (finding that state law 
was preempted because it frustrated the purpose of the agency’s regulatory scheme). 
74. See, e.g., Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (finding that where 
federal interests are sufficiently implicated and there is no applicable act of Congress, “it is for the 
federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards,” which preempts 
conflicting state law); see also Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 881, 890–91, 897 (1986) (“Although at one point there was some doubt, it is now 
established that a federal common law rule, once made, has precisely the same force and effect as any 
other federal rule. It is binding on state judges through the supremacy clause.”).  
75. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312–13 (1981) (“The enactment of a 
federal rule in an area of national concern, and the decision whether to displace state law in doing so, 
is generally made . . . by the people through their elected representatives in Congress.”); see also 
Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020) (explaining the Court’s general reluctance to create or 
extend federal common law); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (declining the invitation 
to create federal common law).  
 76. Rodriguez v. FDIC, 140 S. Ct. 713, 716 (2020). 
77. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (“[W]e have held that a few 
areas, involving ‘uniquely federal interests,’ . . . are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the 
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Court fashioned a common law rule, referred to as the “government contractor 
defense,”78 by which federal contracts can preempt conflicting state law. Although 
Boyle involved a contract for military equipment, lower federal courts have since 
extended Boyle’s preemption defense to civilian contractors for goods79  
and services.80  
2. Intergovernmental Immunity 
The origins of intergovernmental immunity trace to the foundational case 
McCulloch v. Maryland.81 There, Chief Justice Marshall held that Maryland could not 
tax the National Bank because “[s]tates have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to 
retard, impede, burden, in any manner control the operations . . . [of] the powers 
vested in the general government.”82 This immunity principle was derived from 
structural principles and lodged in the Supremacy Clause.83 In McCulloch, and for 
the next century, the Court was unwilling to treat intergovernmental immunity as a 
matter of degree.84 Thus, the Court routinely quashed state laws that interfered, 
even remotely, with the federal government or its instrumentalities.85 For example, 
 
United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal 
law of a content prescribed . . . by the courts—so-called ‘federal common law.’” (citations omitted)). 
78. Id. at 511–12. Lower federal courts had applied variations of the government contractor 
defense prior to the Supreme Court’s imprimatur in Boyle. See, e.g., VIVIAN S. CHU & KATE M. MANUEL, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41755, TORT SUITS AGAINST FEDERAL CONTRACTORS: AN OVERVIEW OF 
THE LEGAL ISSUES 12–15 (2011); RODNEY M. PERRY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43462, TORT SUITS 
AGAINST FEDERAL CONTRACTORS: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 2–3 (2014).  
79. See, e.g., Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1118 (3d Cir. 1993). 
80. See, e.g., Hudgens v. Bell Helicopter/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334–45 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(accepting government contractor defense of a company providing helicopter maintenance to the 
army); Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Props., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 400, 421–24 (D.S.C. 1994) 
(applying the defense to a company supplying decontamination services to the Environmental 
Protection Agency). In the context of a service contract, the Boyle test remains essentially the same: (1) 
the government must have approved reasonably precise procedures to be followed in providing the 
service, (2) the contractor’s performance must have conformed to those procedures, and (3) the 
contractor must have warned the government about dangers in those procedures that were known to 
it, but not to the government. See Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1335. 
81. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425–37 (1819). 
82. Id. at 317. 
83. Id. at 396, 405, 432 (referring to federal supremacy); S. Candice Hoke, Transcending 
Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829, 854 (1992) 
(arguing that the Supremacy Clause “does not explicitly support [Chief Justice] Marshall’s embroidery”).  
84. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 430 (warning against enmeshing courts in the “perplexing” 
business, “so unfit for the judicial department,” of attempting to delineate “what degree of taxation is 
the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse of the power”); see also Dawson v. Steager, 
139 S. Ct. 698, 704 (2019) (eschewing de minimis exception to intergovernmental tax  
immunity doctrine).  
85. See, e.g., Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 57 (1920); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 283 
(1899) (invalidating a state law that required the person in charge of an eating house at a federal home 
for disabled veterans to put out a small printed sign that would read “oleomargarine sold and  
used here”). 
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state laws stood no chance if they indirectly raised the federal government’s cost of  
doing work.86  
Beginning in the New Deal era, however, the Court “decisively rejected” and 
“thoroughly repudiated” the notion that “any state regulation which indirectly 
regulates the Federal Government’s activity is unconstitutional.”87 This doctrinal 
adjustment, the Court explained, was necessary to respect state sovereignty;88 the 
indirect effects of state law on the federal government were “normal incidents” of 
“two governments” operating in the same territory.89 So reconceived, the 
intergovernmental immunity doctrine was considerably milder than Chief Justice 
Marshall’s original formulation. Under the modern doctrine, states cannot 
(1) directly regulate the federal government or its instrumentalities; or (2) 
discriminate against the federal government or those with whom it deals.90  
Under the first prong, courts apply the “legal incidence” test,91 which focuses 
on where the legal incidence of state law falls.92 State laws that directly regulate the 
federal government or its instrumentalities are constitutionally prohibited.93 
Meanwhile, state laws that indirectly affect the federal government or its 
instrumentalities (economically or otherwise) clear this doctrinal hurdle.94 By 
woodenly focusing on where the “legal incidence” directly falls, the Court avoids 
some difficult line-drawing problems that plagued its earlier approach.95 Moreover, 
by judicial design, the legal incidence test provides states some leeway to regulate 
 
86. See, e.g., Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 222 (1928) (state tax on 
military contractor); Dobbins v. Comm’rs of Erie Cnty., 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842) (tax on  
federal employee).  
87. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 434–45 (1990) (explaining the shift); James  
v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 160–61 (1937) (providing a contemporary explanation). 
88. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 422 (1938). 
89. Id. 
90. See North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 436; South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 516–23 (1988) 
(discussing evolution of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine). Worth noting is that the Supreme 
Court’s decisions do not draw discernable distinctions between state tax laws and state regulations; the 
Court cites the cases interchangeably. See, e.g., North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 454 n.36. There is an argument, 
however, that they should be treated differently. Cf. Boeing Co. v. Movassaghi, 768 F.3d 832 (9th  
Cir. 2014) (opining that state regulations affect federal programs in ways that state taxation does not). 
91. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6–34 (3d ed. 1999) 
(discussing the legal incidence test). 
92. Id.  
93. See North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 439 (“Congress has the power to confer immunity from state 
regulation on Government suppliers beyond that conferred by the Constitution alone . . . .”); Goodyear 
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 180 (1988) (“It is well settled that the activities of federal 
installations are shielded by the Supremacy Clause from direct state regulation unless Congress provides 
‘clear and unambiguous’ authorization for such regulation.”). 
94. See United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 44 (1964) (explaining that intergovernmental 
immunity doctrine “does not forbid a tax whose legal incidence is upon a contractor doing business 
with the United States, even though the economic burden of the tax, by contract or otherwise, is 
ultimately borne by the United States”); accord United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733–34 (1982). 
95. See TRIBE, supra note 91, § 6–34, at 1059. 
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federal contractors, which generally do not qualify as federal instrumentalities for 
purposes of intergovernmental immunity.96  
Under the doctrine’s second prong, state law must not “discriminate” against 
the federal government “or those with whom it deals.”97 Discrimination in this 
context has a special meaning: state law must not treat the federal government or 
its contractors worse than similarly situated constituents in the state.98 Moreover, 
when testing for discrimination, courts assess the state regulatory scheme as a 
whole.99 This functional approach can cut both ways. State laws that appear 
nondiscriminatory, when viewed in isolation, may be deemed discriminatory when 
considered alongside other provisions. Conversely, state laws that are discriminatory 
on their face may not, in fact, leave the federal government or its contractors  
worse off.100  
II. PUZZLE ONE—DOES THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
APPLY TO GENERALLY APPLICABLE (NONDISCRIMINATORY) STATE 
REGULATIONS? 
There is no dispute that preemption doctrine applies to state laws directed at 
federal contractors. Nor is there any dispute that discriminatory state laws could run 
afoul of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. From that starting position, the 
puzzle treated here is whether federal contractors should be constitutionally 
immune from nondiscriminatory state law under the auspices of intergovernmental 
immunity doctrine.  
 
96. See Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and  
Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 704 
n.100 (1976) (“‘Instrumentalities’ do not include independent contractors, employees, or others dealing 
for their own purposes with the federal government but only those entities ‘so assimilated by the 
Government as to become one of its constituent parts.’” (quoting United States v. Township of 
Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958))); Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm’n, 318 U.S. 261, 269–70 
(1943) (“[T]hose who contract to furnish supplies or render services to the government are not [federal 
instrumentalities] and do not perform governmental functions . . . .” (citations omitted)); Alabama  
v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 9 (1941) (same). 
97. See, e.g., North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 438; South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523 (1988). 
98. See Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544–45 (1983); see also Dawson v. Steager, 
139 S. Ct. 698, 704–05 (2019) (“Whether a State treats similarly situated state and federal employees 
differently depends on how the State has defined the favored class.” (citing Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989))); United States v. Cnty. of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 462–64 (1977) 
(requiring that regulations be imposed equally on all similarly situated constituents of a state and not 
based on a constituent’s status as a government contractor or supplier). 
99. See North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 438 (“A state provision that appears to treat the Government 
differently on the most specific level of analysis may, in its broader regulatory context, not  
be discriminatory.”). 
100. See id. 
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A. Sibling Rivalry 
In North Dakota, the Supreme Court vetted but did not fully resolve this 
puzzle.101 The case arose when the federal government sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief against North Dakota’s regulation of liquor sold to army bases.102 
More specifically, the state’s regulations subjected out-of-state liquor suppliers to 
labeling and monthly reporting requirements.103 The federal government argued 
that the state laws violated intergovernmental immunity and, alternatively, were 
preempted by federal procurement law.104  
In a plurality decision penned by Justice Stevens, the Court rejected both 
claims.105 Regarding preemption, the plurality found no conflict between federal 
procurement laws and the state laws at issue.106 Regarding intergovernmental 
immunity, the plurality held that North Dakota cleared the legal incidence test 
(prong one) because the labeling and reporting requirements fell directly on the 
government’s contractors.107 The plurality acknowledged that the government 
might be indirectly burdened with increased liquor costs, yet that was immaterial 
under the legal incidence test, which looks to where the legal burden directly falls.108 
Second, the plurality found that North Dakota cleared the antidiscrimination test 
(prong two).109 Although the state laws at issue treated in-state and out-of-state 
suppliers differently, the regulatory regime as a whole did not leave the government 
worse off.110 Consequently, the plurality held that North Dakota’s liquor laws did 
not discriminate against the federal government and thus did not violate 
intergovernmental immunity.111  
In so holding, the plurality expressly rejected the invitation to extend 
intergovernmental immunity to nondiscriminatory state regulations. According to 
the plurality, intergovernmental immunity was limited to (i) direct state regulation of 
the federal government, and (ii) discriminatory state regulation against the 
government or those with whom it deals.112 By contrast, the validity of indirect and 
 
101. See infra notes 118–124 and accompanying text. 
102. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 426, 428–30. 
103. Id. at 429, 433. 
104. Id. at 434, 440. 
105. Id. at 436–39. 
106. Id. at 439–44. 
107. Id. at 436–37. 
108. Id. at 437–38. 
109. Id. at 437–39. 
110. Id. at 438–39. According to the plurality, the comparative reference group was other liquor 
retailers in the state. Whereas those retailers could only purchase liquor from state-licensed wholesalers, 
the government had the additional option of purchasing from out-of-state wholesalers who complied 
with the state labeling and reporting requirements at issue. Id. Justice Scalia cast the deciding fifth vote. 
See id. at 445–48 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (lamenting the judicial mischief in the Court’s 
holistic approach to the antidiscrimination test, but agreeing with the result reached in the case in light 
of special considerations under the Twenty-First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). 
111. Id. at 438–39.  
112. Id.  
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nondiscriminatory state regulation “must be resolved” under preemption principles.113 
In the plurality’s view, these parameters were forged in earlier cases to 
“accommodat[e] . . . the full range of each sovereign’s legislative authority and 
respect[ ] . . . the primary role of Congress in resolving conflicts between the 
National and State Governments.”114 Elaborating further, the plurality thought “it 
would be both an unwise and an unwarranted extension of the intergovernmental 
immunity doctrine for this Court to hold that the burdens associated with the 
labeling and reporting requirements—no matter how trivial they may prove to  
be—are sufficient to make them unconstitutional.”115  
In a partially concurring and dissenting opinion, penned by Justice Brennan, 
four justices deemed the labeling requirement discriminatory.116 But, even if not 
discriminatory, Justice Brennan argued that the intergovernmental immunity 
doctrine should apply nonetheless.117 More specifically, he argued that the doctrine 
extends to state regulations that “substantially obstruct” or “actually and 
substantially interfere[ ] with specific federal programs.”118  
Justice Brennan’s approach would erect two, substantially overlapping, 
doctrinal hurdles for nondiscriminatory state regulations to clear.119 First, to clear 
the preemption hurdle, state regulations must not “frustrate” or pose “an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”120 Then, to clear intergovernmental immunity, state regulations must not 
“actually and substantially interfere with” (or “substantially obstruct”) federal 
programs.121 If these Supremacy Clause hurdles are formal and functional 
equivalents, then perhaps this doctrinal puzzle is much ado about nothing.  
But North Dakota’s cantankerous 4-4 split suggests otherwise.122 Foremost, 
Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan drew support for their respective positions in 
 
113. Id. at 435. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 444. 
116. Id. at 451–52 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with 
conclusions reached by the plurality’s holistic approach with respect to North Dakota’s labeling 
requirement in light of the economic burdens imposed on the suppliers and passed on to  
the government). 
117. Id. at 437–39. 
118. Id. at 451–52. Justice Brennan offered no explanation for the difference, if any, between 
obstruction and interference. Perhaps he intended for the term obstruction to incorporate a 
requirement of “actual” interference. So construed, “substantial obstruction” may have been intended 
as a shorthand for “actual and substantial interference.” Elsewhere in the opinion, however, Justice 
Brennan muddied the waters on this point, using various phraseology seemingly interchangeably. See, 
e.g., id. at 467 (“actually obstructs” federal activity); id. (“burden” the federal government “in its conduct 
of governmental operations”); id. (“obstructs” federal operations); id. at 471 (“The operations of the 
Federal Government are constitutionally immune from such interference by the several States.”). 
119. Id. at 470–71. 
120. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000). 
121. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 452. 
122. Compare id. at 435–38 nn.7–10, with id. at 452–59 nn.3–6 (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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the Court’s precedents. Whereas Justice Stevens read the precedents as resting on 
preemption grounds (rather than intergovernmental immunity), Justice Brennan 
thought that characterization was “at odds with the reasoning in the opinions 
themselves.”123 Moreover, Justice Brennan denounced the idea of “rigid 
demarcation between the two Supremacy Clause doctrines,” which he said did not 
exist in prior cases.124 For precisely those reasons, however, the Justices’ battle for 
the precedential high ground in North Dakota left no clear victors.  
Take, for example, Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas,125 on which both Justices 
relied in support of their respective viewpoints. In Leslie Miller, the Court held that 
the federal government’s building contractors were immune from an Arkansas 
regulation that required all building contractors to obtain a state license.126 Whether 
Leslie Miller was decided on intergovernmental immunity or preemption grounds is 
far from clear.127 The bulk of the Court’s analysis in Leslie Miller focused on the 
“conflict[s]” between federal and state law, which is the vocabulary of 
preemption.128 In its closing remarks, however, the Court cited and quoted from 
the pre-New Deal case of Johnson v. State of Maryland,129 which invalidated a state 
licensing scheme on intergovernmental immunity grounds.130  
Similarly, in Public Utilities Commission of California v. United States,131 the Court 
invalidated a state law requiring common carriers to receive state approval before 
offering free or reduced rates to federal employees.132 The state law, according to 
the Court, was in plain “conflict” with the government’s policy of negotiating 
rates.133 Again, that bespeaks preemption, insofar as the conflict with federal policy 
animated the Court’s holding. But, blurring doctrinal lines, the Court also quoted 
language from McCulloch with tones of intergovernmental immunity.134 
 
123. Id. at 452. 
124. Id. 
125. 352 U.S. 188 (1956). 
126. Id. at 190. 
127. As discussed in more detail in Part II, lower federal courts have generally adopted the 
plurality’s view that Leslie Miller was decided on preemption grounds. See, e.g., Gartrell  
Constr. Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1991) (treating Leslie Miller as a preemption case);  
cf. United States v. Virginia, 139 F.3d 984, 989 n.7 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting “disagreement over whether 
Leslie Miller was a preemption or an intergovernmental immunity case” between plurality and dissenters 
in North Dakota). 
128. Leslie Miller, 352 U.S. at 190. 
129. 254 U.S. 51 (1920). 
130. Leslie Miller, 352 U.S. at 190 (discussing the “immunity of the instruments of the United 
States from state control in the performance of their [contractual] duties” (quoting Johnson, 254  
U.S. at 57)). 
131. 355 U.S. 534 (1958). 
132. Id. at 545–46. 
133. Id.  
134. Id. at 544 (“It is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action 
within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt 
its own operations from their own influence.” (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
427 (1819))). 
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Soon after, in United States v. Georgia Public Service Commission, the Court 
invalidated Georgia’s attempt to revoke operating certificates of moving companies 
that provided discounted rates to the federal government.135 The rates were 
negotiated with the federal government, pursuant to federal procurement 
regulations, but fell below the minimum rates required by state law.136 Ruling for 
the federal government, the Court reasoned that Georgia’s policy must “give way” 
to the federal government’s “oppos[ing]” procurement policy.137 In so holding, the 
Court explicitly invoked the Supremacy Clause and cited the reasoning of Public 
Utilities Commission.138 Yet, for reasons already explained, these references shed no 
additional light: preemption and intergovernmental immunity both hail from the 
Supremacy Clause, and the Public Utilities Commission decision, itself, sent mixed 
doctrinal signals.139 
I could go on. But no amount of retrospective case crunching will resolve this 
doctrinal puzzle. Even if it could, old answers would not necessarily be satisfying. 
The Court’s Supremacy Clause doctrines have dynamically evolved since the early 
republic.140 Most notably, as the pre-New Deal model of “dual federalism” gave 
way to increasingly overlapping federal-state regulation, the Court reined in both 
Supremacy Clause doctrines to retain a semblance of the federalist structure.141 For 
present purposes, that historical context is important for two related reasons. 
First, these doctrines are not static: they have changed in the past, and can 
change again, to accommodate and compensate for structural changes to our 
systems of government. Second, the Court’s twentieth century precedents are 
inattentive to the transformative effects that modern federal outsourcing has had 
on the federalist structure and, more generally, on our constitutional democracy.142 
It was not until the mid-1990s—after North Dakota was decided—that the 
“Reinventing Government” movement took hold of the political mainstream and 
fundamentally changed how government operates.143 Thus, even if it were possible 
to construct a satisfying doctrinal portrait of the past, old answers would not 
necessarily be satisfying today.  
 
135. 371 U.S. 285 (1963). 
136. Id. at 286–87. 
137. Id. at 292–93. 
138. Id. 
139. See generally id. 
140. See supra Part I.B.1 (preemption), Part I.B.2 (intergovernmental immunity). 
141. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950); John 
David Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle Preemption, 47 GA. L. REV. 369, 381–83 (2013). 
142. See Rubenstein, Supremacy, Inc., supra note 2, at 1127–30 (explaining the spillover effects 
of federal outsourcing on federalism); see also supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (collecting 
sources about privatization’s implications for constitutional rights, separation of powers, and  
administrative law). 
143. See generally GORE, supra note 37; OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 37. See also LIGHT, 
supra note 35, at 37–44 (describing a “shadow” government of millions of contractors and other private 
actors who more than offset the reductions in federal employees).  
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B. Preemption (Not Intergovernmental Immunity) 
On institutional, doctrinal, and pragmatic grounds, the federal government’s 
constitutional immunity from state law should not shield contractors from 
nondiscriminatory state law. Skeptics may reasonably worry that states will 
overcompensate, overregulate, and obstruct federal programs.144 Moreover, 
excessive restrictions could hinder the government’s ability to get its work done 
effectively and efficiently.145 These are valid concerns, but much less so when 
properly contextualized.  
In some scenarios, state interference can smoke out problems in outsourced 
federal programs and improve them. In other scenarios, nondiscriminatory state 
laws might undermine federal outsourcing goals. For that reason, intergovernmental 
immunity doctrine is arguably underinclusive. But doctrinal underinclusiveness is 
not inherently problematic; indeed, constitutional law brims with underinclusive 
(and overinclusive) doctrines.146 The normative question, in this context as always, 
is whether doctrinal underinclusiveness is tolerable or preferable to 
overinclusiveness. Because preemption doctrine can pick up the slack of a 
suboptimal intergovernmental immunity doctrine, underinclusiveness seems the 
better choice. Specifically, nondiscriminatory state law that “obstructs” or 
“substantially interferes” with federal programs might be preempted under 
preexisting or responsively enacted federal law. And if not preempted, that is a very 
good indicator that state law is either not interfering with federal programs, or 
interfering in banal, benign, or beneficial ways. 
An overinclusive intergovernmental immunity doctrine, by contrast, would 
aggrandize judicial power vis-à-vis Congress (a separation of powers concern) and 
aggrandize federal power vis-à-vis the states (a federalism concern). To be sure, 
preemption doctrine is not fully absolved of these structural tensions.147 All else 
 
144. Cf. Steven J. Kelman, Achieving Contracting Goals and Recognizing Public Law Concerns: A 
Contracting Management Perspective, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 153, 177–78 ( Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (voicing concern that if new 
legal regimes are brought to bear on federal outsourcing, such regimes could be “exploited by 
organizations seeking to use it for reasons unrelated to promotion of public law values—with major 
impacts on the ability of contracts to be expeditiously awarded and successfully administered”); 
Metzger, supra note 15, at 1454 (noting that Congress may not want to create federal causes of action 
against contractors because such exposure “increases the costs of privatized programs, undermines the 
flexibility and efficiency that governments hope to gain through privatization, and deters  
private participation”). 
145. See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 13 ( Jody Freeman  
& Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
146. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 
904 (1999) (discussing the inherent underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness in constitutional doctrine 
because of the Court’s need to set rules); Metzger, supra note 15, at 1421–22, 1431 (identifying 
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness of the state action doctrine). 
147. Perhaps most notably, the Court’s obstacle preemption doctrine has come under scrutiny 
as an untoward expansion of the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“My review of this Court’s broad implied pre-emption precedents, particularly 
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equal, however, concerns about judicial overreaching are mitigated as the center of 
decisional gravity shifts away from courts to Congress. On that score, preemption 
has intergovernmental immunity beat. In preemption analysis, Congress’s statutory 
purpose is the “ultimate touchstone.”148 In theory, this oft repeated maxim provides 
a focal point for analysis rooted in statutory interpretation. Of course, statutory 
interpretation is notoriously fickle, in ways that muddy preemption analysis.149 By 
comparison, however, intergovernmental immunity is arguably worse—and 
inherently so—because it is implied from the Supremacy Clause with no textual 
hook to guide the analysis. 
Subjecting nondiscriminatory state laws to intergovernmental immunity 
doctrine not only shifts decisional power to the judiciary, it makes it considerably 
harder for the federal political branches to avoid or correct judicial misfires. Under 
current doctrine, Congress can save state law that would otherwise be displaced 
under intergovernmental immunity doctrine. By contrast, Congress and federal 
agencies can save state law from preemption. This difference—in who  
decides—can be quite significant, owing to political and procedural differentials in 
how such decisions are made. Whereas Congress can only pass laws pursuant to the 
finely wrought legislative process,150 agencies can generally issue binding regulations 
much more efficiently and flexibly.151 Under Justice Brennan’s approach, a state law 
would be null under intergovernmental immunity doctrine if a court determined 
that it actually obstructed or substantially interfered with federal policies.152 
Congress could avoid that judicial result, ex ante, or overcome it ex post, by clearly 
and unambiguously expressing its intent to save state law.153 Under current doctrine, 
however, federal agencies could not save state law in this scenario.154 
 
its ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence, has increased my concerns that implied  
pre-emption doctrines have not always been constitutionally applied.”); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 
VA. L. REV. 225, 231 (2000) (arguing that “constitutional law has no place for the Court’s fuzzier 
notions of ‘obstacle’ preemption, under which state law is preempted whenever its practical effects 
would stand in the way of accomplishing the full purposes behind a valid federal statute”). See generally 
Rubenstein, supra note 71 (arguing that administrative preemption is an affront to separation of powers 
and federalism). See also infra note 161 and accompanying text (noting debates around the “presumption 
against preemption,” both in theory and practice).  
148. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[T]he purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
149. See, e.g., Daniel Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2013).  
150. See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (discussing the 
“finely wrought” and cumbersome legislative requirements of bicameralism and presentment). 
151. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (notice-and-comment requirements). Under notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, the agency must provide advance notice of its proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register 
and offer interested parties the opportunity to submit written comments in response. Id.  
152. See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 467 (1990); see also supra notes 117–122 
and accompanying text. 
153. See, e.g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976) (explaining that “where ‘Congress does 
not affirmatively declare its instrumentalities or property subject to regulation,’ ‘the federal function 
must be left free’” of state regulation (quoting Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447–48 (1943))). 
154. I am not aware of any case in which the Court has recognized an agency’s authority to alter 
the constitutional default rules of intergovernmental immunity. The fact that intergovernmental 
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Relatedly, the burdens of proof differ between preemption and 
intergovernmental immunity. “In all preemption cases, and particularly in [fields] 
the States have traditionally occupied,” the Court has instructed that the historic 
police powers of the States are “not to be superseded . . . unless that was the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress.”155 At least in theory, this presumption against 
preemption is the Court’s way of avoiding unintended encroachments on state 
sovereignty.156 By placing an interpretive thumb on the scale in favor of state 
interests, state law is not displaced merely because federal law happens to touch the 
same subjects. Indeed, concurrent federal and state regulation is the norm of 
modern federalism, unlike the rigid federal-state demarcations of the pre-New  
Deal era.157  
The presumption against preemption may be overcome by clear evidence of 
Congress’s express or implied intent to preempt state law.158 By contrast, the 
presumption runs in the opposite direction in intergovernmental immunity cases.159 
Specifically, state law that directly regulates or discriminates against the federal 
government or those with whole it deals is presumptively invalid, unless Congress 
clearly and unambiguously specifies otherwise.160 Taking these doctrinal canons at 
face value, and all else equal,161 the choice of doctrinal frame can thus be outcome 
 
immunity is defeasible by Congress does not mean that it is defeasible by agencies pursuant to a general 
delegation of rulemaking authority. Cf. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 180 (1988) (“It 
is well settled that the activities of federal installations are shielded by the Supremacy Clause from direct 
state regulation unless Congress provides ‘clear and unambiguous’ authorization for such regulation.” 
(emphasis added)). 
155. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal marks and citations omitted). 
156. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (“[B]ecause the States are 
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly 
preempt state-law causes of action.”); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663–64 
(1993) (explaining the purpose behind the presumption against preemption). 
157. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 783 (1994) 
(explaining that, in the pre–New Deal era, when Congress enacted laws in a field in which it was 
empowered to legislate, state law was deemed inoperative in the field without regard to whether 
particular state laws conflicted with the substance of the federal regime). 
158. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“Consideration of issues 
arising under the Supremacy Clause ‘starts with the assumption that historic police powers of the States 
[are] not to be superseded . . . by Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))); see also CSX Transp., 
Inc., 507 U.S. at 663–64 (“In the interest of avoiding unintended encroachment on the authority of the 
States . . . a court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law 
will be reluctant to find pre-emption.”). 
159. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976). 
160. See, e.g., id. at 179 (explaining that “where ‘Congress does not affirmatively declare its 
instrumentalities or property subject to regulation,’ ‘the federal function must be left free’” of state 
regulation (quoting Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447–48 (1943))). 
161. There are, of course, reasons not to take these doctrinal formulations at face value. Some 
jurists and scholars view the presumption against preemption as analytically bankrupt. See, e.g., Mary  
J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 968 (2002) (“There is 
no such presumption any longer, if, indeed, there ever really was one.”). The Court is hardly consistent 
in how and when it invokes the presumption. See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic 
Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 733 (1991) (“The Supreme Court’s devotion to its 
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determinative in a large category of cases: namely, where Congress’s intent to 
preempt state law or waive intergovernmental immunity is less than clear. Extending 
intergovernmental immunity doctrine to nondiscriminatory state law would, 
effectively, amount to a muscular form of “obstacle preemption”—free from the 
presumption against preemption, and without statutory guideposts.162  
III. PUZZLE TWO—ARE STATE LICENSING LAWS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL 
PROCUREMENT LAW? 
This Part turns to a second puzzle of procurement preemption: namely, 
whether state licensing laws are preempted by federal procurement law, including 
under the so-called “Leslie Miller rule.”163 Federal contracting is a thickly regulated 
and complex regime. Mercifully, most of the details are beyond the scope of this 
Article. But some of the details matter. Indeed, a main objective here is to shine 
light on which details matter for preemption analysis and why. Before plunging in, 
three general features of federal procurement law will help to frame much of the 
discussion that follows.  
 
presumptions [against preemption] . . . can only be described as fickle.”); Catherine M. Sharkey, Against 
Freewheeling, Extratextual Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice Clarence Thomas the Lone Principled Federalist?, 
5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 63, 78 (2010) (“[T]he Court’s track record with respect to the presumption 
against preemption is murky.”). Even when employed, the Court generally does not signal how 
important the presumption is to the outcome of cases, in relation to other considerations and 
evidentiary inputs. The same can probably be said of the clear statement rule applied in 
intergovernmental immunity cases, but there are far fewer cases (and thus fewer data points) on which 
to base that assessment. Suffice to say, neither the presumption against preemption nor its mirror image 
in intergovernmental immunity cases are analytically precise. Still, that imprecision does not imply 
methodological equanimity. 
162. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing obstacle preemption); Crosby  
v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (“What is a sufficient obstacle [for purposes 
of conflict preemption], is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a 
whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.”). 
163. See, e.g., Gartrell Constr. Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437, 441 (9th Cir. 1991) (invoking the 
“Leslie Miller rule” to invalidate a state licensing requirement as applied to a federal construction 
contractor); Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, No. 3:18-CV-1114 (MPS), 2020 WL 
2079634, at *9 (D. Conn. Apr. 30, 2020) (invoking “the rule of Leslie Miller” to invalidate state licensing 
requirements for federal student loan servicers). For purposes of this analysis, my focus is on 
nondiscriminatory state licensing laws, and I assume that discriminatory state licensing schemes would 
run afoul of intergovernmental immunity unless Congress has specified otherwise. See supra notes  
91–94 and accompanying text. In regard to preemption, ED and its contractors argue that state 
regulations are displaced by a range of federal laws, some but not all of which are procurement laws. 
See, e.g., Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal Student 
Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10619 (Mar. 12, 2018); Student Loan 
Servicing All. v. District of Columbia (SLSA), 351 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D.D.C. 2018). For this Article, I 
focus on procurement law preemption because it is more generally applicable, less understood, and, to 
my knowledge, has escaped academic scrutiny until now. Whether other federal law preempts state laws 
as applied to student loan servicers is an important question in its own right, but turns on the details of 
the various federal and state laws at issue. For judicial treatments of those preemption questions, see, 
for example, Lawson-Ross v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 955 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2020); Nelson 
v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2019); Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936 
(9th Cir. 2010).  
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First, federal procurement law is not geared toward federalism or questions of 
preemption.164 The exceptions to this general rule are limited and domain specific. 
For example, in some contexts, Congress has expressly immunized federal 
contractors from state law.165 In other contexts, Congress has expressly made state 
law applicable to federal contractors.166 In most contexts—including student loan 
servicing—Congress has not decided one way or the other. Thus, the puzzle is how 
to deal with that ambivalence as it pertains to state licensing regimes.  
Second, federal procurement law aspires toward myriad goals and values.167 
As summarized by Steven Schooner, those objectives include competition, integrity, 
transparency, efficiency, customer satisfaction, best value, wealth distribution, risk 
avoidance, and uniformity.168 These pluralistic values do not always align; trade-offs 
among them are necessary and inevitable. Federal procurement law makes those 
trade-offs through a range of procurement processes, contractual provisions, 
performance incentives, accountability mechanisms, and a mix of delegated 
discretion and nonnegotiable mandates.169 The important takeaway, for present 
 
164. To be clear, federal contracting and federalism are inextricably linked in our era of 
contractual governance—the student loan imbroglio is a headline example. See Rubenstein, Supremacy, 
Inc., supra note 2, at 1121–30 (providing a theoretical account of the relationship between federal 
contracting and federalism). 
165. Examples of immunity statutes include 6 U.S.C. § 442(d) (creating the rebuttable 
presumption that the government contractor defense shall apply to the seller of qualified antiterrorism 
technologies in lawsuits related to the deployment of such technologies), and 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d 
(allowing immunity for “covered person[s]”—in the event of a public health emergency  
declaration—from liability relating to certain countermeasures against disease). In other contexts, 
however, Congress has rejected bills to immunize federal contractors from state law. See, e.g., Gulf Coast 
Recovery Act (GCRA), S.B. 1761, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (2005). If enacted, the GCRA would have 
established immunity for contractors performing post-disaster recovery work, through a rebuttable 
presumption of the government contractor defense. Id.; see also Steven L. Schooner & Erin  
Siuda-Pfeffer, Post-Katrina Reconstruction Liability: Exposing the Inferior Risk-Bearer, 43 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 287, 291–97 (2006) (comparing and contrasting federal contractor indemnity and immunity 
statutes, and arguing against passage of the GCRA on normative grounds); Boyle v. United  
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 515 n.1 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing six proposed bills concerning 
limits on government contractor liability that were defeated in Congress). 
166. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 182–83 (1988) (holding that 40 
U.S.C. § 290 provided clear congressional authorization for application of state workmen’s 
compensation law to contractors operating a federal nuclear facility).  
167. Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government, 
50 AM. U. L. REV. 627, 634–37 (2001) (“The laws, regulations, and policies controlling the award and 
performance of government contracts present a dense thicket reflective of a large,  
complex bureaucracy.”). 
168. See Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, 11 
PUB. PROCURMENT L. REV. 103 (2002). 
169. See Schooner, Fear of Oversight, supra note 167, at 635. See generally 48 C.F.R. §§ 5.000–5.705 
(2019) (discussing publicizing requirements for contract actions); id. §§ 6.000–6.502 (detailing 
competition requirements); id. §§ 13.000–15.609 (detailing simplified acquisitions, sealed bidding, and 
contracting by negotiation); id. §§ 16.000–16.703 (describing types of contracts); id. §§ 52.000–52.301 
(containing standard and optional provisions and clauses); id. §§ 19.000–19.1508 (addressing small 
business programs); id. §§ 22.000–22.2110 (outlining labor law compliance); id. §§ 23.000–23.1105 
(explaining environment, conservation, occupational safety, and drug-free workplace requirements);  
id. §§ 25.000–25.1103 (highlighting domestic preferences); id. §§ 37.000–37.604 (service contracts). 
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purposes, is that federal contracting is not one-size-fits-all. The procurement laws 
and contractual terms that pertain to federal student loan servicing, for example, 
differ in key respects from other types of federal procurement (such as for pencils, 
construction, military operations, and so on). This variability matters for 
preemption because the procurement laws that apply in one context may not apply, 
or may apply differently, in other contexts.  
Third, the procurement system is not static. Indeed, a reason why federal 
contracting is not homogenous is because federal procurement laws have evolved 
throughout history to emphasize and deemphasize certain values over others.170 In 
prior eras, for example, the government was generally required to award contracts 
to the lowest-cost, technically acceptable offeror.171 Today, however, the lodestar 
for federal procurement is “best-value,” which is determined by a range of 
considerations, including cost, performance, quality, and reliability.172 The 
pendulum shifts in federal procurement law matter for preemption because judicial 
decisions from prior eras may be distinguishable or outmoded by subsequent 
procurement regimes. Most pertinent here, the mid-twentieth-century case of Leslie 
Miller v. Arkansas,173 upon which ED and its contractors rely,174 is such a case. 
Properly understood, Leslie Miller does not categorically shield federal contractors 
from state licensing requirements.  
A. Federal Procurement Law: Then and Now  
Throughout most of the twentieth century, federal contracting law was an 
uncoordinated maze of agency-specific standards and practices.175 During that time, 
 
170. See generally NAGLE, supra note 28 (discussing the evolution of federal outsourcing through 
American history). See also Guttman, supra note 34, at 881–90 (discussing the ideological and political 
shift toward federal outsourcing in the mid-to-late twentieth century); Dan Guttman, Government by 
Contract: The White House Needs Capacity to Account for the Legacy of 20th Century Reform, 4 EMORY 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 115 (2017) (providing an account of federal 
outsourcing through the twentieth century); JOHN T. JONES, JR., GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW: THE 
DESKBOOK FOR PROCUREMENT PROFESSIONALS (4th ed. 2017) (noting that Congress has revisited 
issues relating to federal procurement procedures to strike different balances between contracting 
efficiency and other system goals); Schooner, Fear of Oversight, supra note 167, at 636 (“The mid-1990s 
witnessed a tsunami of procurement reforms heralded as the most successful aspect of [Vice President] 
Gore’s reinventing government initiative, which were intended to make the procurement system less 
bureaucratic and more businesslike.”). 
171. See infra notes 176–178 and accompanying text. 
172. See 48 C.F.R. § 1.102(a) (2019) (defining and describing best-value contracting); see also 
supra notes 145–150 and accompanying text. 
173. 352 U.S. 187 (1956). 
174. See, e.g., Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, No. 3:18-CV-1114 (MPS), 2020 WL 
2079634, at *9 (D. Conn. Apr. 30, 2020) (invoking “the rule of Leslie Miller” to invalidate state licensing 
requirements for federal student loan servicers). 
175. See 1 COMM’N ON GOV’T PROCUREMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 31–33 (1972) (reporting on “a burdensome mass and maze of 
procurement and procurement-related regulations” within the federal government, and “no effective 
overall system for coordinating, controlling, and standardizing regulations”); see also NAGLE, supra note 
28, at 504–05. 
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most federal contracting was conducted through a sealed bidding process.176 
Contracting officials would publicly unseal the bids, determine whether the lowest 
priced bid was responsive to the government’s solicitation, and award the contract 
to the lowest priced “responsible” bidder—i.e., those who met financial, ethical, 
and other background requirements.177 This process prioritized fairness and 
integrity by limiting the range of considerations, and thus discretion, available to 
contracting officials in source selection.178 Today, sealed bidding is much less 
common, and only used in very limited contexts. 
In 1984, Congress passed the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA).179 
Among other things, CICA introduced new requirements for conducting “full and 
open” competitions, eliminated the statutory preference for sealed bidding, and 
encouraged agencies to award contracts through negotiated processes.180 To 
implement CICA, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) system was established 
to codify a set of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive 
agencies.181 FAR, as amended, is the backbone of modern federal procurement of 
goods and services.182 
The express and overarching purpose of FAR is to “deliver . . . the best value 
product or service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling 
 
176. See Gary L. Hopkins, Bidding Federal Contracts, 23 A.F. L. REV. 73–74 (1982–1983) 
(“Formal advertising is a competitive sealed bid method of contracting and is the statutorily preferred 
method of acquisition.”); RICHARD A. SMITH, THE PROCUREMENT REFORMS OF 1984, BRIEFING 
PAPERS NO. 85-6, at 6–7 (1985) (discussing the pre-1984 bias toward “formal advertising” bidding, 
which is now referred to as “sealed bidding”); see also 48 C.F.R. § 14.101(e) (“After bids are publicly 
opened, an award will be made with reasonable promptness to that responsible bidder whose bid, 
conforming to the invitation for bids, will be most advantageous to the Government, considering only 
price and the price-related factors included in the invitation.”).  
177. SMITH, supra note 176, at 6–7; see also 48 C.F.R. § 14.101(e) (“After bids are publicly opened, 
an award will be made with reasonable promptness to that responsible bidder whose bid, conforming 
to the invitation for bids, will be most advantageous to the Government, considering only price and the 
price-related factors included in the invitation.”); Afro-American Datanamics, Inc., B-190703, 77-2 
CPD ¶ 448 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 8, 1977) (ruling that the phrase “other factors considered” cannot be 
used to justify an award to other than the low responsible bidder whose bid conforms to  
the solicitation”).  
178. See, e.g., United States v. Brookridge Farm, Inc., 111 F.2d 461, 463 (10th Cir. 1940); see also 
SMITH, supra note 176, at 6–7. 
179. 41 U.S.C. § 253. 
180. Id. 
181. See generally NAGLE, supra note 28, at 503–17 (discussing the evolution of the uniform 
regulation system, culminating with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which first became 
effective on April 1, 1984). For a highly accessible and informative summary of FAR, see MANUEL ET 
AL., supra note 28.  
182. See MANUEL ET AL., supra note 28, at 11–14 (discussing the amendment process and a 
range of amendments made in response to legislation, executive orders, litigation, and policy 
considerations). While the FAR contains the principal rules of the federal acquisition system, it is not 
the only authority governing acquisitions of goods and services by executive branch agencies. Statutes, 
agency FAR supplements, other agency regulations, and guidance documents may also apply. See id. at 
14–16, 19–20; see also infra notes 267–269 and accompanying text (discussing statutory acquisition 
requirements for federal student loan servicers). 
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public policy objectives.”183 Toward achieving best value, FAR instructs agencies to 
examine the strengths and weaknesses of all relevant factors (such as cost, 
performance, quality, and schedule) and to make trade-offs between cost and 
noncost factors.184 As these and other FAR provisions make clear, price is not the 
only consideration, or even the most important. For example, 48 C.F.R. § 15.101 
instructs that “the relative importance of cost or price may vary” for different types 
of acquisitions.185 Generally, for example, “cost or price may play a dominant role 
in source selection” where the requirements for performance are “clearly definable” 
and the “risk of unsuccessful contract performance is minimal.”186 By contrast, 
nonprice considerations—such as “technical or past performance”—may “play a 
dominant role in source selection” when the performance requirements are less 
specified and the risk of unsuccessful performance is greater.187 FAR cautions that 
“[t]he award of a contract . . . based on lowest evaluated price alone can be false 
economy if there is subsequent default, late deliveries, or other unsatisfactory 
performance resulting in additional contractual or administrative costs.”188 
Moreover, FAR promotes a number of social policies that are collateral to 
contractual performance (such as minimum wage requirements, workplace 
diversity, and small business set-asides),189 which can increase costs and decrease 
competition relative to free-market baselines.190  
In these and other ways, FAR balances a range of values. Cost and efficiency 
matter but are not the only things that matter. Any suggestions to the contrary by 
the government and its contractors should be greeted with suspicion.  
B. Procurement  Preemption 
Nothing in FAR expressly preempts state licensing laws and regulations. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued—successfully in some cases—that certain FAR 
provisions impliedly preempt state law.191 The FAR provisions most directly at issue 
pertain to a contracting officer’s “responsibility” determination, which is a condition 
precedent for all government procurement contracts.192 Specifically, FAR provides 
 
183. 48 C.F.R. § 1.102(a) (2019). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. § 15.101. 
186. Id.  
187. Id. 
188. Id. § 9.103(c). 
189. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §§ 19.000–19.1508 (2019) (addressing small business programs);  
id. §§ 22.000–22.2110 (outlining labor law compliance); id. §§ 23.000–23.1105 (explaining environment, 
conservation, occupational safety, and drug-free workplace requirements); id. §§ 25.000–25.1103 
(highlighting domestic preferences). 
190. See Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection and 
Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 344 (2004) (observing that socioeconomic preferences limit 
competition because they limit contractual opportunities to members of a designated class). 
191. See infra Part II.C.  
192. 48 C.F.R. § 9.103(a) (“Purchases shall be made from, and contracts shall be awarded to, 
responsible prospective contractors only.”). 
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that “[n]o purchase or award shall be made unless the contracting officer makes an 
affirmative determination of responsibility.”193 Among other things, the 
responsibility standards require that contract awardees have “adequate financial 
resources”; a “satisfactory past performance record”; “the necessary organization, 
experience, facilities” and “technical skills” to perform the contract; and a 
satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics.194 These standards aim to protect 
the integrity of the contracting process and to mitigate the risk of contractual 
nonperformance.195 
As relates to preemption, three additional points about FAR’s responsibility 
requirement will help to prime the discussion below. First, contracting officials 
make this determination prior to the award of federal contracts.196 Once the contract 
is awarded, the responsibility determination has no bearing on monitoring, 
performance, or sanctions during the contract’s lifecycle. Rather, those matters are 
governed by other federal laws and contractual terms.197 
Second, the practical significance of a responsibility determination is 
contextually contingent. In sealed bidding competitions, for example, the 
contracting official generally must award contracts to the lowest-priced responsible 
bidder.198 In that context, responsibility determinations, as well as price, take on 
added significance because those considerations are generally determinative.199 By 
contrast, in negotiated competitions, responsibility determinations are less 
consequential because contract awards are based on a wider mix of 
considerations.200 To be clear, a responsibility determination is required for all 
 
193. Id. § 9.103(b). The government had a practice of avoiding awards to non-responsible 
contractors prior to CICA. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D. Mass. 1934). However, the 
concept of responsibility was not expressly adopted in federal procurement statutes until the  
mid-twentieth century, when the Armed Services Procurement Act and the Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act were enacted. See 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b) (1948); 41 U.S.C. § 253 (1950). 
194. 48 C.F.R. § 9.104–1; see also KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40633, 
RESPONSIBILITY DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION: LEGAL 
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES (2013) (providing explanations of FAR’s responsibility standards and 
processes); Orca Nw. Real Est. Servs. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 1 (2005) (discussing criteria for 
responsibility), on reconsideration, 65 Fed. Cl. 419 (2005). 
195. 48 C.F.R. § 9.103; Ryan Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 646 (1999). 
196. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.103; Orca Nw. Real Est. Servs., 65 Fed. Cl. 1. 
197. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (penalties for false claims); 48 C.F.R. § 37.114 (requiring agency 
oversight, control, and monitoring of federal service contracts); id. §§ 49.000–49.607 (termination  
of contracts). 
198. 48 C.F.R. § 14.101(e) (“Contract award. After bids are publicly opened, an award will be 
made with reasonable promptness to that responsible bidder whose bid, conforming to the invitation 
for bids, will be most advantageous to the Government, considering only price and the price-related 
factors included in the invitation.”). 
199. Id.; see also SMITH, supra note 176, at 7 (explaining that, under the pre-CICA sealed bidding 
regime, “[t]he standard solicitation ‘boilerplate’ usually stated that the most advantageous bid would be 
accepted, ‘price and other factors considered.’ However, in practice this meant that only cost-related 
factors were considered, as long as the bidder could demonstrate that he could perform the contract”). 
200. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.302 (“The objective of source selection is to select the proposal that 
represents the best value.”); see also Latecoere Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 19 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir.) 
(explaining that in negotiated procurement, contracting officials have broad discretion to determine 
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federal contracts awarded under FAR.201 But, in negotiated procurements, 
responsibility determinations are often pro forma and pale in comparison to other 
determinants of source selection.202 A contracting officer’s signature on a contract 
suffices to indicate contractor responsibility; no other written explanation  
is required.203  
Third, a responsibility determination is not designed to, and does not as a 
matter of law, insulate federal contractors from post-award obligations and 
requirements. For example, other federal statutes, FAR provisions, and mandatory 
contractual terms create penalties for a contractor’s misfeasance and malfeasance.204 
Nor does a responsibility determination under FAR foreclose third-party causes of 
action under federal or state law. For example, the False Claims Act creates a liability 
scheme for contractors who knowingly make false claims for payment and allows 
private persons to file suit on the government’s behalf.205 Meanwhile, the Federal 
Tort Claims Act expressly does not exempt federal contractors from state tort 
liability.206 Such immunity may attach through other means.207 The point here is that 
FAR’s responsibility requirement is silent on that question.  
 
manner in which they will make use of technical and cost evaluation results), amended by 19 F.3d  
1342 (1994). 
201. 48 C.F.R. § 9.103(b) (“No purchase or award shall be made unless the contracting officer 
makes an affirmative determination of responsibility.”).  
202. Cf. Ralph C. Nash, Challenging an Affirmative Responsibility Determination: Once in a Month 
of Sundays, 28 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 65 (2014) (explaining that contractor officers, in practice, 
“generally perceive[ ] the responsibility determination of the offeror that has proposed the best value as 
a pro forma exercise”); Anthony H. Anikeeff, Avoiding the “Blacklisting” Minefield, FED. LAW., 
Mar./Apr. 2001, at 42 (“Burdened by the lack of regulatory guidance about what constitutes a 
‘satisfactory record’ [of past performance] . . . . [T]his aspect of the responsibility determination has 
come to be perceived as often constituting a mere pro forma stamp of approval for the successful 
prospective contractor.”). 
203. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.105-2(a)(1). Moreover, affirmative responsibility determinations are 
generally beyond judicial reproach. See, e.g., Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 714 
F.2d 163, 167 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (describing responsibility determination as a “practical, . . . not legal 
determination”); YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 366, 394 (1993). Only in rare 
circumstances do courts overturn responsibility determinations. See Impressa Construzioni  
Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 421 (2002) (finding that contracting officer 
failed to conduct an independent and informed responsibility determination); see also 4 C.F.R. § 21.5(c) 
(2020) (explaining that “[b]ecause the determination that a bidder or offeror is capable of performing a 
contract is largely committed to the contracting officer’s discretion, [the Government Accountability 
Office] will generally not consider a protest challenging such a determination,” subject to  
narrow exceptions). 
204. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (penalties for false claims); 48 C.F.R. § 49 (termination  
of contracts). 
205. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3730. A suit filed by an individual on behalf of the government is 
known as a “qui tam” action. Id. § 3730; see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40785, QUI 
TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES (2009).  
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (“[T]he term ‘Federal agency’ includes the executive departments, the 
judicial and legislative branches, the military departments, independent establishments of the United 
States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States, but does 
not include any contractor with the United States.”). 
207. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing statutory immunity and indemnity 
provisions for federal contractors); see also Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–06, 512 
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Thus, if state licensing laws are preempted by FAR’s responsibility 
requirements, then it must be on account of an implied preemption. As earlier 
explained, state law will be impliedly preempted when compliance is “impossible” 
without violating federal law, when federal regulation is “so pervasive” that it leaves 
no room for state law in the same “field,” or when state law “stands as an obstacle” 
to the “accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives” of federal 
law.208 These preemption strands have important commonalities. As the Supreme 
Court recently explained, each requires a type of conflict between federal law and 
state law.209 That analysis, in turn, requires an examination of the particular federal 
and state laws at issue. Lastly, whether a preemptive conflict exists requires 
judgment: namely, whether the putative conflict is of a type or degree to warrant 
the displacement of state law.210 Because some amount of friction is inevitable (if 
not desirable) in our federalist system, not all conflicts are deemed by the Court to 
be preemptive conflicts.211  
These rudiments of preemption doctrine generally go unstated because there 
is often no need to express them. Here, however, a sturdy grasp of preemption and 
procurement law will help to dispel the myth that federal contractors are 
categorically immune from state licensing requirements under the so-called “Leslie 
Miller rule.” 
C. Leslie Miller (and Progeny) 
Leslie Miller is a four-page per curiam opinion from a bygone era of federal 
procurement.212 The Court held that an Arkansas licensing law conflicted with the 
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 and the army’s implementing 
regulations.213 Those procurement laws required the army to award construction 
contracts to the lowest-priced responsible bidder.214 Arkansas law, however, 
 
(1988) (providing tort law immunity under the auspice of federal common law when, inter alia, state 
law conflicts with federal contractual specifications). 
208. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
209. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1479 (2018) (explaining that 
a conflict between federal and state law is the preemption doctrine’s sine qua non). 
210. Cf. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (“What is a sufficient 
obstacle [for purposes of conflict preemption], is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining 
the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.”). 
211. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S 238, 256 (1984) (holding that state tort 
liability against federally licensed nuclear operator was not preempted despite the “tension between the 
conclusion that safety regulation is the exclusive concern of the federal law and conclusion that a state 
may nevertheless award damages based on its own law of liability”); Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated 
Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) (“Undoubtedly, every subject that merits congressional 
legislation is, by definition, a subject of national concern. That cannot mean, however, that every federal 
statute ousts all related state law . . . . Instead, we must look for special features warranting  
pre-emption.”).  
212. Leslie Miller v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956). 
213. Id. at 188–89 (citing Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 413, 62  
Stat. 21, 23 (1948)). 
214. Id. at 190. 
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precluded contractors from even bidding on federal contracts unless they first 
obtained a state license.215 To obtain a state license, construction firms had to meet 
a set of qualifications that significantly overlapped with the army’s pre-award 
responsibility determination.216 The Court struck down the Arkansas requirements 
because, otherwise, “the State’s licensing board [would have] a virtual power of 
review over the federal determination of ‘responsibility’ and would thus frustrate 
the expressed federal policy of selecting the lowest responsible bidder.”217 Leslie 
Miller was decided under the applicable federal procurement laws at the time; it did 
not create a categorical rule against state licensing of federal contractors. 
A few years later, the Supreme Court cited and quoted Leslie Miller approvingly 
in Sperry v. State of Florida ex rel. Florida Bar.218 Yet Sperry did not establish a 
categorical rule against state licensing of federal contractors; indeed, Sperry did not 
even involve a federal contractor or procurement law. Rather, the state licensing law 
at issue prohibited non-attorneys from practicing law in the state.219 The Court 
deemed this law preempted as applied to practitioners authorized by federal 
regulation to represent clients in connection with certain patent proceedings.220 In 
this non-procurement context, the Court quoted Leslie Miller’s dictum that a “[s]tate 
may not enforce licensing requirements which . . . give ‘the State’s licensing board a 
virtual power of review over the federal determination’ that a person or agency is 
qualified and entitled to perform certain functions.”221 Yet the type of  preemptive 
conflict, and the federal laws at issue, were quite different in Leslie Miller and Sperry. 
The Sperry Court devoted several pages to the legislative intent and history of the 
federal licensing scheme—which has no direct bearing on the purpose or history of 
federal procurement in general, much less a contractor responsibility determination 
under FAR.  
Apart from Leslie Miller, the Court has never opined on the preemptive effect 
of federal procurement laws vis-à-vis state licensing of federal contractors. The 
Court’s most recent foray on the subject, in North Dakota v. United States, arguably 
comes closest.222 After determining that the state liquor regulations were not barred 
by intergovernmental immunity,223 the plurality turned to the federal government’s 
alternative claim:  namely, that the liquor regulations were preempted by federal  
procurement law.224 The applicable federal statute provided that purchases of 
alcoholic beverages for resale on military installations “shall be made from the most 
 
215. Id. at 188. 
216. Id. at 189. 
217. Id. 
218. 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963). 
219. Id. at 381. 
220. Id. at 384–85, 404. 
221. Id.  
222. See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 439–42 (1990). 
223. See supra notes 107–111 and accompanying text.  
224. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 439–42. 
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competitive source, price and other factors considered.”225 Interpreting this 
language, the plurality held that Congress “has not . . . spoken with sufficient clarity 
to preempt” the state liquor regulations at issue.226 The plurality acknowledged that 
the state regulations had the effect of increasing the costs for out-of-state liquor 
suppliers, which in turn could increase the government’s purchasing price from 
those sources.227 The plurality explained, however, that increased costs did not 
prevent the federal government from engaging in competitive bidding or  obtaining 
liquor at the most competitive price.228 Rather, the increased cost of compliance 
with the state regulations would, at most, upwardly adjust the most competitive 
price available to the government.229  
The plurality then turned to the Department of Defense regulation, which 
directed army procurement officials to “consider various factors in determining ‘the 
most advantageous contract, price and other considered factors.’”230 Again, 
however, this regulatory command could not “be understood to pre-empt state laws 
that merely have the incidental effect of raising costs for the military.”231 Justice 
Scalia, who cast the deciding vote in the case, concurred in the result and took no 
issue with the plurality’s preemption analysis.232  
Although the state laws at issue were not licensing laws, the preemption 
holding in North Dakota dispels any notion that a responsibility  
determination—which is a prerequisite to all federal contracts—creates a per se bar 
against state regulations of federal contractors. If anything, North Dakota makes 
clear that a responsibility determination does not preempt state regulations, even 
when such regulations may have collateral effects on contract pricing and 
competition.233 
1. Abstractions and Extensions 
Unfortunately, some lower courts have abstracted away from Leslie Miller’s 
core holding by decontextualizing the nature of the preemptive conflict in that case. 
This has resulted in unnecessary and precarious intrusions on state sovereignty. 
The Ninth Circuit stumbled down this path in Gartrell Construction  
Inc. v. Aubry.234 The case arose when California imposed labor law penalties on a 
federal contractor that was operating in the state without a construction license.235 
The contractor argued that the state licensing law was preempted by the federal 
 
225. Id. at 440 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 2488(a)(1)). 
226. Id. at 439–41.  
227. Id. at 431. 
228. Id. at 443–44. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 442 (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 261.4 (1986) (repealed Mar. 10, 2006)). 
231. Id. at 442. 
232. See id. at 444–48 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
233. Id. at 423. 
234. 940 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1991). 
235. Id. at 438. 
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contracting official’s responsibility determination under FAR.236 The Ninth Circuit 
agreed that California was “effectively attempting to review the federal 
government’s responsibility determination,” which was “prohibited” by Leslie 
Miller.237 In so holding, the court rejected California’s attempt to distinguish the 
state licensing law at issue in Leslie Miller, which placed a condition precedent on a 
contractor’s right to bid, and the California statute, which required licensing prior 
to Gartrell’s performance of the contract.238 According to the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he 
concern in Leslie Miller was that a state was asserting a right or power of review over 
the federal government’s determination of ‘responsibility.’”239 Under this broad 
reading of Leslie Miller, it was inconsequential that the federal government was free 
to shop for the most favorable bidder.240 
Before turning to Gartrell’s analytical flaws, it is worth highlighting two things 
the court got right: first, it conducted a preemption analysis (not an 
intergovernmental immunity analysis);241 second, the court looked for conflicts 
between federal and state law. The Ninth Circuit erred, however, because it elided 
important distinctions between the federal and state laws at issue in Leslie Miller and 
Gartrell, which, in turn, tainted the court’s preemption analysis.  
Here is where attention to detail matters. Under FAR, construction 
contractors are generally required to obtain state licenses at no government 
expense.242 Gartrell gave short shrift to this expressed federal policy, on the theory 
that FAR’s responsibility determination took priority over FAR’s state licensing 
requirement.243 But nothing in Leslie Miller (or progeny) compelled that result. 
Unlike Alabama’s law, which prohibited unlicensed contractors from even 
submitting a bid, California’s labor law only penalized unlicensed contractors who 
performed construction work.244 Moreover, when federal contracting officials make 
pre-award responsibility determinations, they generally are not required to verify 
that a contract awardee has the necessary state and local construction licenses.245 
Thus, it is hard to see how a FAR responsibility determination (which occurs  
pre-award and does not inquire into state licensing) conflicts with a state licensing 
 
236. Id. at 438. 
237. Id. at 439. 
238. Id. at 439–40. 
239. Id. at 440. 
240. Id. at 439. 
241. See generally supra Part II. 
242. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.236–7 (2019) (“The Contractor shall, without additional expense to the 
Government, be responsible for obtaining any necessary licenses and permits, and for complying with 
any Federal, State, and municipal laws, codes, and regulations applicable to the performance of  
the work.”).  
243. See generally Gartrell, 940 F.2d 437. 
244. Id. at 438. 
245. See James C. Bateman Petroleum Servs., Inc., 67 Comp. Gen. 591 (1988) (“[W]here a 
solicitation merely contains a more general requirement that the contractor comply with state and local 
licensing requirements, a contracting officer is not expected to inquire into what such licensing 
requirements may be or whether a bidder will comply; instead, the matter is one to be resolved between 
the contractor and the licensing authorities.” (citations omitted)). 
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requirement (which FAR itself contemplates for construction contracts, and which 
was included in the federal contract at issue).246 
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit made similar mistakes in United States  
v. Virginia.247 The Virginia laws at issue required licensing and registration of private 
investigators operating in the state.248 The United States argued that the state 
requirements could not be applied to federal contractors hired by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to perform federal background checks.249 Like the 
Ninth Circuit in Gartrell, the Fourth Circuit in Virginia held that the state 
requirements were preempted by federal procurement law250 and that Leslie Miller 
“compelled” this result.251  
The Fourth Circuit’s misstep traced, in part, to its threshold finding that the 
“federal regulatory schemes at issue” in Virginia and Leslie Miller were “virtually 
identical in every important respect.”252 In this regard, the Virginia court found that 
“the FBI, like the armed services in Leslie Miller, is obliged to select the  
lowest-priced ‘responsible bidder.’”253 But that was not so. Unlike the construction 
procurement regime at issue in Leslie Miller, the FBI’s acquisition of services did 
not require the agency to select the lowest-priced responsible bidder. Indeed, by 
limiting the solicitation to former FBI agents, the agency reduced market 
competition and almost certainly paid a premium on contractual awards.  
Moreover, quoting Leslie Miller, the Fourth Circuit found that Virginia’s 
regulatory scheme frustrated the objectives of FAR by allowing the state to  
“second-guess” the FBI’s responsibility determination and by giving the state 
licensing board “a virtual power of review over the federal determination of 
‘responsibility.’”254 Again, however, this misunderstands FAR’s responsibility 
requirement and decontextualizes the nature of the regulatory conflict in Leslie 
Miller. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s abstractions in Virginia, the Supreme Court 
has never held that federal contractors are categorically immune from state 
“qualifications in addition to those that the [Federal] Government has pronounced 
sufficient.”255 Rather, preemption depends—as always—on the specifics of the 
federal and state laws at issue, and the degree and types of putative  
conflicts involved.  
 
246. I return to this issue in the context of puzzle three, infra Section IV.B. 
247. 139 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1998). 
248. Id. at 985. 
249. Id. at 986. 
250. Id. at 989–90. 
251. Cf. id. at 987. 
252. Id. at 987–88. 
253. Id. at 989. 
254. Id. at 989. 
255. Id. at 990 (quoting Leslie Miller v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 190 (1956)). 
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2. State Licensing of Federal Loan Servicers 
Little by little, the Court’s context-specific holding in Leslie Miller seems to 
have morphed, in the lower courts, into a generalized presumption or proscription 
against state licensing laws. This entropic and acontextual reading of Leslie Miller 
has infected the domain of student loan law, leaving state legislatures quite unsure 
about whether, and to what extent, they may require federal student loan servicers 
to comply with state licensing and registration laws. This uncertainly is reflected in 
a range of state Student Borrower Bills of Rights, which take different approaches 
to the question.256 In lieu of licensing standards, for example, some states have 
established registration and reporting requirements.257  
Two jurisdictions, which tried to impose licensing requirements on federal 
loan services, were turned back in the lower courts on the basis of Leslie Miller and 
progeny.258 The first case was Student Loan Servicing Alliance v. D.C. (SLSA), which 
held that federal law preempted a set of D.C. licensing and reporting requirements 
as applied to federal student loan servicers.259 Citing Virginia260 and Gartrell,261 the 
district court found that “[c]ourts have consistently held that any state law that 
impedes the federal government’s ability to contract . . . [is] preempted.”262 The 
district court traced this lineage to “the seminal case” of Leslie Miller, and found it 
“difficult to see any light between the facts of [that case] . . . and the [federal] loan 
servicers here.”263 Ultimately, the district court was concerned with the “risk that 
the federal government will contract with a servicer after evaluating its qualifications 
under federal law and regulations, and that servicers nevertheless will be determined 
to be unqualified by the Commissioner and barred from operating in the District 
of Columbia under the D.C. Law and Final Rules.”264 That “threat of . . .  
second-guessing,” according to court, was “sufficient under Leslie Miller to 
invalidate the state licensing scheme” as applied to federally serviced loans.265 
Moreover, the district court found that “[e]ven if the [D.C. licensing] assessment 
mirrored the federal government’s,” it would “not only thwart the federal 
government’s general contracting discretion protected under Leslie Miller,” but also 
 
256. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
257. Compare, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 28102(a) (West 2019) (“No person shall engage in the 
business of servicing a student loan in [California] without first obtaining a license . . . .”), with  
COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-20-106(1) (2019) (deeming federal student loan servicers automatically licensed).  
258. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, No. 3:18-cv-1114 (MPS), 2020 WL 2079634 
(D. Conn. Apr. 30, 2020); Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia (SLSA), 351 F. Supp. 3d 
26 (D.D.C. 2018). 
259. SLSA, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 39–40, 62. 
260. United States v. Virginia, 139 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1998). 
261. Gartrell Constr. Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1991). 
262. SLSA, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 62. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 63. 
265. Id. (citing Virginia, 139 F.3d at 987–90). 
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“directly conflict” with Congress’s “explicit delegation” to ED in the Higher 
Education Act (HEA) to make assessments of contractor suitability.266 
Contrary to the court’s belief, however, there is quite a bit of daylight between 
the applicable federal and state laws in these cases. The HEA explicitly authorizes 
ED to enter contracts with loan servicers and instructs the agency to “ensure that 
such services and supplies are provided at competitive prices.”267 In addition, the 
HEA instructs ED to “enter into contracts only with entities that have extensive 
and relevant experience and demonstrated effectiveness,” obtain “competitive 
prices,” and select “only entities which the [agency] determines are qualified to 
provide such services and supplies.”268 Furthermore, the HEA encourages the 
agency to “maximize the use of performance-based servicing contracts . . . to 
achieve cost savings and improve service.”269  
These HEA provisions overlap, in main respect, to provisions contained in 
FAR. By codifying them in statute, however, Congress signaled its intent to channel 
the agency’s discretion toward certain types of contracting processes and structures 
on FAR’s menu of options. For example, the HEA procurement provisions almost 
certainly rule out sealed bidding and contractual awards to the lowest-priced 
responsible bidder. Put otherwise, the contract award scheme at issue in Leslie 
Miller270 (and Gartrell)271 is clearly not what Congress intended for federal student 
loan servicing contracts. Rather, Congress contemplated negotiated bidding and 
“best value” service contracts—which, as earlier explained, embed a range of 
nonprice considerations.272 Moreover, the HEA’s mandate that ED select 
contractors with “extensive and relevant experience” simply limits the pool of 
potential awardees, presumably to mitigate downstream risks of contractual 
noncompliance or misfeasance. 
In SLSA, the district court did not explain how exactly the D.C. laws would 
conflict with federal procurement requirements.273 At most, there was a “risk” that 
the D.C. laws would prevent a federal loan servicer from operating in the district.274 
But that is a curious, if not spurious, basis for preemption. Conflict preemption 
 
266. Id. 
267. 20 U.S.C. § 1087f(a)(1). 
268. Id. 
269. Id. § 1018(a). Moreover, the HEA instructs the agency to “maximize the use of 
performance-based servicing contracts . . . to achieve cost savings and improve service.”  
Id. § 1087f(a)(1). 
270. Leslie Miller v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 190 (1956). 
271. Gartrell Constr. Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1991). 
272. Leslie Miller, 352 U.S. 187; Gartrell, 940 F.2d 437; see also 48 C.F.R. § 3415.302-70 (2020) 
(explaining that “[t]he contracting officer must conduct the second phase of the source selection 
consistent with FAR 15.2 and 15.3,” which pertain to negotiated purchasing). 
273. See generally Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia (SLSA), 351 F. Supp. 3d 
26 (D.D.C. 2018). 
274. Id. at 63. 
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requires “an actual conflict, not merely a hypothetical or potential conflict.”275 Even 
if the “risk” of an adverse D.C. licensing decision came to fruition, it would not 
amount to “second-guessing” ED’s affirmative responsibility determination. Most 
obviously, ED’s responsibility determination was made years earlier, based on 
information available to the contracting officer at the time of contractual award. By 
contrast, a hypothetical determination by D.C. licensing authorities would have 
been based on a different set of facts—including, most importantly, post-
contractual award events. That is not second-guessing; that is a new assessment 
based on different facts.  
To be sure, there is a risk that D.C.’s licensing requirements could affect  
post-award contractual performance, either by increasing costs, accountability, or 
both. These post-award concerns, however, were not at issue in Leslie Miller. 
Moreover, the HEA does not answer how trade-offs among pricing, service quality, 
and accountability should be made. If anything, Congress delegated those qualitative 
judgments to ED, which in turn exercised that discretion in ways that clearly 
prioritized quality and service capabilities in the awarded contracts at issue in SLSA. 
Most notably, ED’s request for proposals in 2009 specified that loan servicing 
contracts would be awarded based on two evaluation criteria—technical factors and 
price—and that the former was slightly more important.276 Thus, unlike the navy in 
Leslie Miller, ED was not bound to select the “lowest responsible bidder.”277 Quite 
the contrary, ED almost certainly would have violated federal law if it had awarded 
contracts on that basis, given the HEA’s prescriptions (for highly experienced 
vendors), FAR’s prescriptions (for best value), and the evaluative criteria specified 
in ED’s solicitation request (which prioritized technical factors over  
price considerations).278 
The district court’s missteps in SLSA carried forth, by inertia, in the loan 
servicing case of Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency v. Perez.279 That 
 
275. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 
Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011); accord English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 
(1990) (“The Court has observed repeatedly that pre-emption is ordinarily not to be implied absent an 
‘actual conflict.’” (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)); Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 
314 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Speculative or hypothetical conflict is not sufficient: only 
State law that ‘actually conflicts’ with federal law is preempted.”); see also Hillsborough Cnty.  
v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985) (explaining that preemption is not to be inferred 
lightly in view of the “presumption” that “the historic police powers of the States were not be 
superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  
(citations omitted)). 
276. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SOLICITATION/CONTRACT/ORDER FOR COMMERCIAL ITEMS 
§ D.4, at 22 add. 3 (2009). 
277. Cf. Leslie Miller v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 190 (1956). 
278. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087f(a)(1) (statutory criteria); 48 C.F.R. § 1.102(a) (2019) (best value); U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 276, § D.4 (stating that three technical evaluation factors (proposed plan, 
solution benefits/risks, and past performance) were of equal importance relative to each other, and 
that these technical factors, combined, “[were] slightly more important than Price”). 
279. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, No. 3:18-cv-1114 (MPS), 2020 WL 2079634, 
at *9 (D. Conn. Apr. 30, 2020) (“I join the reasoning and conclusion reached as to a similar District of 
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case arose from a Connecticut licensing requirement for all student loan servicers 
operating in the state.280 Under Connecticut law, licensees were required to 
“maintain adequate records of each student education loan transaction,” and to 
make those records available to the State Banking Commissioner 
(Commissioner).281 Further, state law authorized the Commissioner “to conduct 
investigations and examinations” and to “access, receive and use” records, 
including, among others, those relating to “criminal, civil and administrative 
history.”282  
 Pursuant to this state regulatory scheme, the Commission requested 
documents from Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA), 
which was a federal student loan servicer operating in the state. PHEAA declined 
to produce the requested records, on the grounds that the state licensing and 
reporting laws were preempted, inter alia, by federal procurement law.283 Conjuring 
the “rule of Leslie Miller,” the district court in Perez held that Connecticut’s licensing 
scheme “presents an obstacle to the federal government’s ability to choose  
its contractors.”284  
 In so holding, Perez explicitly “join[ed] the reasoning and conclusion reached” 
by the district court in SLSA285 and missed the mark for all the same reasons. Like 
in SLSA, the Perez opinion did not explain how, in fact, the state licensing scheme 
conflicted with the federal procurement scheme. In lieu of an actual conflict, the 
district court noted the “prospect that the [state] might deny a license” to a federally 
selected student loan servicer, and that the state scheme “potentially interferes” with 
ED’s selection process.286 That was entirely speculative, for many reasons. Just to 
name a few: there may not even be a future service contract; current federal 
contractors may not wish to bid for that future work; a future Congress or 
administration might explicitly require federal loan servicers to obtain state law 
licensing.287 These contingencies suggest why the government and its contractors 
 
Columbia licensing scheme in a thorough opinion by Judge Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia.”). 
280. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-847 (2019).  
281. Id. § 36a-849(b). 
282. Id. § 36a-851(a). 
283. Perez, 2020 WL 2079634, at *4–5. PHEAA also successfully argued, in the alternative, that 
the record request was preempted by the federal Privacy Act, related agency regulations, and contractual 
terms. Id. at *11–13. Here, I focus solely on the preemption arguments tethered to federal  
procurement regulations. 
284. Perez, 2020 WL 2079634, at *9. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. at *8–9. 
287. Responsibility determinations are themselves based, in part, on consideration of 
contractors’ past performance, or factual information and qualitative judgments about contractors’ 
performance history. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.105-1(c) (2019) (“In making the determination of responsibility, 
the contracting officer shall consider information available through FAPIIS [the Federal Awardee 
Performance Integrity Information System] . . . , including information that is linked to FAPIIS such 
as from SAM, and CPARS, as well as any other relevant past performance information . . . .”); see also 
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want courts to speculate today about potential conflicts tomorrow. For reasons 
already explained, however, nothing in Leslie Miller, federal procurement law, or 
preemption doctrine more generally, countenances the displacement of state law by 
speculative conflicts with federal action.288 Even more to the point, the state 
licensing scheme at issue did not actually conflict with federal procurement law. 
IV. PUZZLE THREE—CAN FEDERAL CONTRACTS “SAVE” STATE LAW FROM 
PREEMPTION?  
It is well settled that federal law can save state law from preemption;289 
generally, Congress and agencies do so through statutes and regulations.290 The 
puzzle taken up here, however, is whether federal contracts can save state law from 
preemption. This issue arises when federal contracts expressly contemplate or 
require that contractors comply with state law. For example, FAR directs 
contracting officials to include a Permits and Responsibilities Clause (P&R Clause) 
in construction contracts.291 The P&R Clause provides, in relevant part, that the 
contractor “shall . . . be responsible for obtaining any necessary licenses and 
permits, and for complying with any Federal, State, and municipal laws, codes, and 
regulations applicable to the performance of the work.”292 Along similar lines, the 
federal contracts at issue in SLSA and Perez provide that ED’s service contractors 
“will be responsible for maintaining a full understanding of all federal and state laws 
and regulations and FSA requirements and ensuring that all aspects of the service 
continue to remain in compliance as changes occur.”293  
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether federal contractual 
terms may save state law from preemption, and lower courts have treated the 
question differently.294 To some extent, the dissensus may owe to how the question 
is framed.  
 
Standard Tank Cleaning Corp., B-245364, 92-1 CPD ¶ 3 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 2, 1992) (finding that 
repeated violations of state law were a basis of an adverse responsibility determination). 
288. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
289. See, e.g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 284 (1995) (quoting a “savings clause” 
in the Safety Act, which provided: “Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued 
under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law”  
(citation omitted)).  
290. Id. 
291. See 48 C.F.R. § 36.507 (“The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.236-7, Permits 
and Responsibilities, in solicitations and contracts when a fixed-price or cost-reimbursement 
construction contract or a fixed-price dismantling, demolition, or removal of improvements contract 
is contemplated.”). 
292. Id. § 52.236-7. 
293. See Sample Contract, supra note 29, at add. § C.1.4.3. Elsewhere, the contracts specify that 
“[s]ervicers will be required to meet all statutory and legislative requirement.” See id. at attach. A-3.  
294. Compare Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1135 (D. Colo. 2015) (rejecting 
preemption challenge, in part, because “the contract [for private immigration detention] specifically 
contemplates . . . perform[ance] under the contract in accordance with ‘[a]pplicable federal, state and 
local labor laws and codes.’”), and United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1091  
(E.D. Cal. 2018) (rejecting preemption challenge, in part, because the immigration detention contracts 
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The discussion below offers three alternative framings and explores how each 
might influence a court’s analysis.295 This framing exercise is especially important 
because the interplay between federal contracts and preemption is highly 
undertheorized. Indeed, how the puzzle is framed can lead courts to very different 
analyses and results.  
A. Framing the Question 
To start, consider three alternative framings:  
1. Can preempted state law be saved by federal contracts?  
2. Can contractual references to state law undermine a preemption claim? 
3. If federal contracts can preempt state law, then why can the contracts 
not save state law? 
Of these, Framing 1 is the most biased against saving state law by contract.296 
Methodologically, this framing’s starting position is that state law is preempted, and 
asks whether contractual terms can overcome or reverse that displacement. Under 
certain circumstances, courts may defer to an agency’s view about whether state law 
conflicts with federal law.297 But if a court has already determined that state law is 
preempted, then a court would be hard pressed to defer to an agency’s contrary 
view expressed in a federal contract.298  
A court might, however, reach a different conclusion under Framing 2. 
Methodologically, this framing takes the contractual terms into account as part of the 
preemption calculus and prior to reaching a conclusion. Essentially, Framing 2 
 
“expressly contemplate compliance with state and local law,” which “demonstrate[d] that California 
retains some authority over the detention facilities”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 921 F.3d 865 
(9th Cir. 2019), with Gartrell Constr. Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.3d 437, 440 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[S]tate licensing 
laws cannot be ‘applicable’, nor compliance with them ‘necessary’, where such laws are preempted by 
federal law.”), and Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia (SLSA), 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 63 
(“If a state law is preempted under the Supremacy Clause, that state law is invalid, and state actors may 
not adhere to it whether directed to by a contract or not.”). 
295. How information is packaged and presented has long been known to affect human 
decision-making. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683, 705 (1999) (discussing “the framing effect, whereby given data are evaluated 
differently depending on how they are framed”). 
296. In Gartrell and SLSA, the district courts’ methodology tracked Framing 1. And in both 
cases, the courts held that federal contracts could not save the state licensing laws at issue. See infra 
Section IV.B.1 (discussing and critiquing the district courts’ treatment of the issue).  
297. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576–77 (2009) (stating that although the Court does 
not defer “to an agency’s conclusion that state law is pre-empted,” the Court does attend “to an agency’s 
explanation of how state law affects the regulatory scheme” because agencies “do have a unique 
understanding of the statutes they administer and an attendant ability to make informed determinations 
about how state requirements may pose an ‘obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress’” (citations omitted)); id. (“The weight we accord the agency’s 
explanation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and 
persuasiveness.” (first citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001); and then citing 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))). 
298. I think it goes without saying that federal contracts cannot supersede federal law.  
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invites courts to consider why agencies would incorporate (preempted) state law 
requirements in federal contracts. One interpretive possibility is that the contracting 
parties were simply not attentive to the actual or potential conflict between 
procurement law and state law incorporated into the contracts. But another 
possibility is that federal procurement law does not, in fact, actually conflict with 
state law requirements. Either way, Framing 2 takes the contractual clauses into 
account as part of the analysis of whether procurement law actually conflicts with 
state law, and if so, whether state law may apply despite the conflict. 
Framing 3 asks a different question: If contractual specifications can preempt 
conflicting state law, then why can’t contractual terms save state law? This framing 
zooms out to capture Boyle, in which the Supreme Court held that “reasonably 
precise” contractual specifications can displace conflicting state law under certain 
conditions.299 The significance of Boyle is that state law may be displaced by 
contractual terms even when state law does not conflict with any federal statutes or 
regulations.300 In the student loan context, and elsewhere, the federal government 
and its contractors have relied on Boyle to argue that state law is preempted by their 
federal contracts.301 Yet they have offered no reason why the same contracts cannot 
also save state law from preemption.  
I am not aware of any court or commentator that has framed the problem in 
these terms,302 and I make no claim of resolving it here. More modestly, the 
discussion below hopes to instigate fresh thinking about the formal and functional 
relationships between federal contracts, federal procurement law, and federalism. If 
nothing else, the alternative frames offer different prisms through which to 
understand, and test, judicial treatments of this puzzle of procurement preemption.   
 
299. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–06, 512 (1988). More specifically, Boyle’s 
government contractor defense precludes liability for state law tort claims regarding design defects 
where “(1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed 
to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of 
the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.” Id. at 512. 
300. Cf. id. at 511 (acknowledging that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not directly apply to, 
and thus did not conflict with, state tort claims against federal contractors); Field, supra note 74, at  
890–91 (“‘[F]ederal common law’ . . . refer[s] to any rule of federal law created by a court (usually but 
not invariably a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal 
enactments—constitutional or congressional.” (footnotes omitted)); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common 
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (describing federal common law as judicially 
crafted “rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text”). 
301. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also infra note 302. 
302. The closest may be Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1135  
(D. Colo. 2015). In that case, immigrant detainees at a federally contracted detention facility alleged that 
the facility’s “Voluntary Work Program” violated Colorado law. Id. at 1135. The district court rejected 
the federal contractor’s preemption defense under Boyle on the grounds that the contracts did not 
conflict with the state law claim at issue. Id. In so holding, the court noted that the contracts explicitly 
contemplated compliance with state law, thus undermining the contractor’s Boyle defense. Id. The 
court’s analysis and holding in Menocal seems to align more with Framing 2 than Framing 3. In any 
event, the Menocal opinion does not address the doctrinal tension that Framing 3 brings to the fore. 
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B. Frames in Action  
1. Framing 1—Gartrell and SLSA (Redux) 
In Gartrell, the federal contract contained a P&R Clause,303 which provided 
that the contractor “shall . . . be responsible” for obtaining state and local licenses 
and permits.304 California pointed to this clause as evidence that the state’s licensing 
requirement was not preempted.305 Under the spell of Leslie Miller’s “strong 
mandate,” however, the Ninth Circuit viewed matters differently. The court 
reasoned that “state licensing laws cannot be ‘applicable’, nor compliance with them 
‘necessary’, where such laws are preempted by federal law.”306  
Take note of the court’s methodology. Having already determined that federal 
procurement law preempted state law, the Ninth Circuit paid little heed to FAR’s 
prescription for the P&R Clause in the contract at issue. For instance, the court did 
not explain why the contracting official’s pre-award “responsibility” determination 
(which makes no mention of state law) should be read to preempt the contractor’s 
post-award licensing “responsibility” (which expressly makes state law applicable). 
Moreover, the court’s interpretation rendered the P&R Clause’s reference to state 
law superfluous: federal contractors would never be responsible for obtaining 
applicable state construction licenses because, upon being awarded the federal 
contract, the pre-award responsibility determination would automatically trump the 
need for state licensing. A better interpretation, because it harmonizes FAR’s 
requirements, is that the agency’s pre-award responsibility determination and the 
contractor’s post-award responsibilities under state law are separate matters.307  
If Gartrell missed the mark, then SLSA missed it by an even wider margin. To 
refute the existence of a preemptive conflict in SLSA, D.C. relied on the contractual 
provision requiring that “contractor(s) will be responsible for maintaining a full 
understanding of all federal and state laws and regulations . . . and ensuring that all 
 
303. See Gartrell Constr. Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437, 440 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing 48 
C.F.R. § 52.236-7 (1990)). 
304. The Permits and Responsibilities Clause is generally included for construction contracts, 
not service contracts. Along similar lines, however, the loan servicing contracts at issue provide that the 
servicers “will be responsible for maintaining a full understanding of all federal and state laws and 
regulations and FSA requirements and ensuring that all aspects of the service continue to remain in 
compliance as changes occur.” See Sample Contract, supra note 29, at add. § C.1.4.3 (emphasis added). 
Elsewhere, the contracts specify that “[s]ervicers will be required to meet all statutory and legislative 
requirements.” See id. at attach. A-3. 
305. Gartrell, 940 F.2d at 440. In this regard, California’s argument aligns most closely with 
Framing 2. 
306. Gartrell, 940 F.2d at 440. Nor was the Ninth Circuit persuaded that alternations to the 
P&R Clause in 1962 “alter[ed] the strong mandate of Leslie Miller.” Id. “The clause in effect when 
Leslie Miller was decided provided: ‘The Contractor shall, without additional expense to the 
government, obtain all required licenses and permits . . . .’ (1951 revision) (emphasis added). The clause 
was revised in 1962 to read as it does today.” Id. 
307. This interpretation also coheres with Leslie Miller, in which Arkansas law forbade  
non-licensed contractors from bidding on federal contracts in the pre-award stage. See supra notes  
215–216 and accompanying text. 
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aspects of the service continue to remain in compliance.”308 Rejecting that 
argument, the district court held that “the existence of contractual provisions 
directing servicers to comply with state law [could] not save” D.C.’s licensing laws 
as applied to federal loan servicers.309 Relying on Gartrell, and employing Framing 
1, the district court reasoned that “[i]f a state law is preempted under the Supremacy 
Clause, that state law is invalid, and state actors may not adhere to it whether 
directed to by a contract or not.”310 The district court deemed the contracting 
parties’ intent irrelevant because “only Congress has the power to preempt state 
law.”311 Although the district court gave passing homage to the presumption against 
preemption, it found the presumption overcome in light of Congress’s “clear and 
manifest purpose” to preempt state law in the HEA.312 More specifically, the district 
court found that Congress had “deliberately delegated the authority” for ED to 
contract with loan servicers, and that “allowing a state to impose separate, and 
potentially conflicting, contracting requirements would nullify that provision.”313 
This analysis is deeply flawed, even on its own terms. To begin with, the 
district court repeated Gartrell’s mistake of overreading Leslie Miller, which does not 
establish a per se rule that state licensing laws are preempted.314 Further, it is simply 
not true—despite the mantra—that “only Congress” has the power to preempt state 
law.315 Agency regulations can also preempt state law.316 Indeed, earlier in the SLSA 
opinion, the district court held that the D.C. licensing laws were preempted, at least 
in part, by FAR’s pre-award contractor responsibility determination.317 Congress’s 
preemptive intent would trump a contrary intent by ED. But Congress’s choice to 
delegate contracting authority to the agency in the HEA says nothing about 
whether, or to what extent, state law might apply to contract awardees. If anything, 
Congress’s statutory mandate that ED select “responsible” and “experienced” 
contractors reflects a preference to minimize the risk of harm to student 
 
308. Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia (SLSA), 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 63 
(D.D.C. 2018). Bolstering its position, D.C. also referenced the Education Department’s 2016 Maryland 
letter, id. (explaining that if loan servicers were determined to be “collection agencies,” the Maryland 
Collection Agency Licensing Act “would not conflict with the Department’s contracts with [loan 
servicers], which provide generally that loan servicers . . . must comply with State and Federal law”), 
and 2017 Mitchell Memo, id. (explaining that “[s]ervicing contracts should comply with federal and state 
law, taking any necessary steps to support oversight by federal or state agencies, regulators, or law 
enforcement officials”). 
309. Id. 
310. Id.  
311. Id. at 64 (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012)). 
312. Id. 
313. Id. at 65. 
314. See supra notes 212–233 and accompanying text.  
315. SLSA, F. Supp. 3d at 63. 
316. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.  
317. See supra notes 263–264 and accompanying text (discussing this portion of the  
SLSA decision). 
First to Printer_Rubenstein [Final].docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  1:26 PM 
250 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:207 
borrowers.318 In turn, ED exercised its delegated discretion with this very concern 
in mind, which D.C.’s licensing laws also hoped to further. 
Moreover, the district court’s assumption that contracting parties cannot save 
state law is hardly a forgone conclusion. First, the court offered no legal reason why 
the parties could not agree by contract to comply with otherwise inapplicable state 
law. Federal contracts routinely subject contractors to otherwise inapplicable federal 
standards as a price for doing business with the government.319 That being so, what 
prohibits the federal government or its contractors from complying with otherwise 
inapplicable state laws? If this prohibition exists, it is nowhere found in the 
Supremacy Clause, applicable procurement law, or Leslie Miller.  Indeed, as earlier 
explained, FAR explicitly contemplates that contractors will obtain state and local 
licensing and permissions in certain contexts.320  
2. Framing 2—Making Contracts Part of the Preemption Calculus 
Under Framing 2, courts are invited to take federal contracts into account as 
part of the preemption analysis. A recent case out of the Ninth Circuit, United States 
v. California, offers a useful illustration of this approach.321  
The California case arose when the government sought to enjoin enforcement 
of several provisions of California law as applied to federal contractors. Most 
pertinent here, California Assembly Bill 103 (AB 103) directed the state attorney 
general to review and report on private immigration detention centers.322 In 
furtherance of this objective, AB 103 states that the attorney general “shall be 
provided all necessary access for the observations necessary to effectuate [these] 
reviews . . . , including, but not limited to, access to detainees, officials, personnel, 
and records.”323 The federal government argued that AB 103’s “review and 
reporting requirement interfered with the Federal Government’s exclusive authority 
in the area of immigrant detention” and posed an “obstacle . . . to administering the 
federal immigration scheme.”324 California countered by arguing, inter alia, that the 
review and reporting requirements fell comfortably within the attorney general’s 
 
318. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087f(a)(1); id. § 1087e(d)(1), (d)(4), (e), (m); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-663, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: EDUCATION COULD DO MORE 
TO HELP ENSURE BORROWERS ARE AWARE OF REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS OPTIONS 4–12 
(2015) (discussing a range of borrower protections and repayment options). 
319. See generally, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §§ 22.000–22.2110 (2019) (Application of Labor Laws to 
Government Acquisitions); id. §§ 23.000–23.1105 (Environment, Energy and Water Efficiency, 
Renewable Energy Technologies, Occupational Safety, and Drug-Free Workplace); id. § 52.203-13 
(Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct); 41 U.S.C. § 6703(2) (requiring certain service 
contracts to include a provision for fringe benefits “not otherwise required by Federal, State, or local 
law to be provided by the contractor or subcontractor”). 
 320. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.  
321. United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1085 (E.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part and remanded, 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019). 
322. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12532 (West 2020). 
323. Id. § 12532(c). 
324. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d at 1090 (citations to the government’s brief omitted). 
First to Printer_Rubenstein [Final].docx (Do Not Delete) 10/27/20  1:26 PM 
2020] STATE REGULATION OF FEDERAL CONTRACTORS 251 
constitutional authority “to enforce state laws and conduct investigations relating to 
subjects under his jurisdiction.”325 Moreover, California pointed to federal 
immigration detention contracts, which expressly reference state and local law.326 
One provision, for example, required that “[a]ll services and programs shall comply 
with . . . all applicable federal, state and local laws and regulations.”327 
Siding with California, the district court found nothing in the relevant 
immigration-detention procurement laws that preempted states from overseeing 
detention facilities operating within their borders.328 Indeed, the court explained, 
the federal contracts “demonstrate that California retains some authority over the 
detention facilities.”329 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this point,330 and 
acknowledged that the contracts “require that immigration facilities conform to 
California’s authority.”331  
The Ninth Circuit’s analyses in Gartrell and California are arguably in tension. 
Gartrell approached the issue through Framing 1 and held that federal procurement 
law preempted the otherwise “applicable” state law contemplated in the federal 
contract at issue.332 Subsequently, California approached the issue through Framing 
2 and reasoned that the contractual requirement to comply with “applicable” state 
law undermined—and ultimately defeated—the government’s preemption claim.333 
While the laws and contracts differed,334 the analytical frames differed too, in ways 
that seemed to affect the outcomes.  
3. Framing 3—Dealing with Doctrinal Asymmetry 
The third frame offers yet another approach to the puzzle of whether federal 
contracts can save state law from preemption. Recall that in Boyle, the Supreme 
Court imbued federal contracts with preemptive effect despite the fact that the 
 
325. Id. 
326. Id. at 1091. 
327. See id.; see also United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 886 n.10 (9th Cir. 2019) (taking 
note of this provision). 
328. California, 314 F. Supp. at 1091 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(g)(1)–(2), 1103(a)(11)). 
329. Id. 
330. California, 921 F.3d at 886. Other aspects of the district court’s opinion relating to different 
California laws were reversed and remanded.  
331. Id. at 886 n.10. 
332. Gartrell, 940 F.2d at 440. 
333. California, 921 F.3d at 886 n.10.  
 334. Gartrell involved a state licensing requirement and state sanctions for noncompliance; 
California involved a review and reporting scheme, and no sanctions had been issued. Still, that 
distinction only matters if Leslie Miller erects a special, per se rule against state licensing. Even then, 
California might be read as a rejection of the premises underlying the “Leslie Miller rule.” More 
specifically, California found no basis for deeming state law preempted, despite express congressional 
delegation of contracting authority to the agency, and despite the agency’s pre-award responsibility 
determination. Nor did the district or circuit courts think that the state attorney general’s review and 
reporting of the facilities amount to an impermissible “second-guessing” of the contracting agency. See 
California, 921 F.3d at 886 n.10. 
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contracts were not federal law.335 Elsewhere, I have argued that preemption by 
contract is constitutionally and normatively problematic, precisely because federal 
contracts are not law, and thus should not qualify as the “supreme Law of the 
Land.”336 Yet, so long as federal contracts can preempt state law, then why can they 
not save state law? This puzzle does not admit of any obvious or easy solutions. 
Any theory that supports preemption by contract might also support saving by 
contract. Conversely, any theory that rejects saving state law by contract might 
antagonize the legitimacy of preemption by contract.  
For instance, one possible theory in support of preemption by contract is that 
state law should not apply to contractors who are merely following agency 
instructions.337 By the same logic, however, perhaps state law should apply to 
contractors when agencies so instruct. Or, consider the theory gestured to in Gartrell 
and SLSA: namely, that because federal contracts are not law, they cannot 
overcome the preemptive effects of federal law. That theory looks right, in isolation, 
but runs headlong into Boyle. After all, if federal contracts do not qualify as federal 
law, then why should they be treated as “supreme Law of the Land”?338  
Until a satisfying reason is offered for this doctrinal asymmetry, the default 
should be toward doctrinal symmetry. That can take one of two possible forms. 
First, under a formalist theory that federal contracts are not law, such contracts 
could not preempt or save state law. Alternatively, under a functionalist theory, 
federal contracts could preempt and save state law.  
I do not rule out the possibility of a theory that could justly treat federal 
contracts as law, and nonlaw, simultaneously. The government and its contractors, 
however, have yet to air one. In the meantime, the Supreme Court (1) has ruled 
that federal contracts can preempt state law,339 and (2) has never addressed whether 
federal contracts can save state law. Unless and until the Court provides additional 
guidance, jurists and scholars should not blithely assume that federal contracts can 
preempt, but not save, state law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored three doctrinal puzzles of procurement preemption 
that may have wide ranging implications for the futures of federalism and federal 
contracting. 
The first puzzle is whether the federal government’s constitutional immunity 
extends to shield its contractors from nondiscriminatory state laws. This Article 
argued that such laws are the purview of preemption doctrine, not 
 
335. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–06, 512 (1988). 
336. See Rubenstein, Supremacy, Inc., supra note 2, at 1160–66. 
337. Cf. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 n.6 (2001) (noting that Boyle’s 
government contractor defense is a “special circumstance” in which the “government has directed a 
contractor to do the very thing that is the subject of the claim”). 
338. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause). 
339. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504–06, 512. 
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intergovernmental immunity. This approach does not deny the possibility of 
immunizing federal contractors from state law. Such immunity, however, would 
have to come from proper lawmaking channels rather than by constitutional default.  
The second puzzle is whether federal procurement law preempts state 
licensing of federal contractors. This Article argued that it depends, as always, on 
whether a preemptive conflict exists between federal and state law. This return to 
first principles bucks the conventional but mistaken view that state licensing laws 
are categorically preempted under the “Leslie Miller rule.” No such rule exists. 
Arguments to the contrary overlook basic precepts of preemption doctrine and 
modern procurement law.  
The third puzzle is whether federal contracts can save state law from 
preemption. Here again, the answer depends. This Article offered three conceptual 
frames, each of which might lead to a different answer because they capture more 
(or less) information and contextual clues. Framing 3 is perhaps the most intriguing, 
as  it puts pressure on Boyle’s government contractor defense. If nothing else, courts 
should insist on an explanation from the government and its contractors for why 
federal contracts can only preempt, and not save, state law.  
  
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